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 550 U.S. 124 (2007). Carhart II will hereinafter be used to refer to the Gonzales1
decision, which upheld the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban.
83
“Partial-Birth Abortion” 
Is Not Abortion: 
Carhart II’s Fundamental 
Misapplication of Roe
Samuel W. Calhoun
ABSTRACT: In explaining his constitutional objection to Wisconsin’s
partial-birth abortion ban, Judge Richard Posner contrasts killing during
“normal labor” with partial-birth abortion. The former can be constitutionally
prohibited, but the latter cannot. Why the distinction? For Posner, the former
involves “killing a live baby that is half-born,” whereas the latter does not.
This article will show that Judge Posner is correct to assert that killing a baby
in the midst of the birth process is not constitutionally protected. But Judge
Posner is wrong to say that partial-birth abortion does not kill “a live baby
that is half-born.” This article will demonstrate that the partial-birth
procedure in fact does kill a baby during its birth. Ban-proponents are correct
in their long-standing argument that the partial-birth procedure is not really
an abortion. Consequently, Roe, properly understood, is inapplicable to
partial-birth abortion bans. Courts, however, including the U.S. Supreme
Court in Carhart II, have nonetheless routinely used the analytical
framework of Roe and Casey to evaluate bans. This common mistake
undermines current partial-birth abortion jurisprudence. The rational basis
test, not Roe/Casey, is the proper evaluative tool. Using the correct standard
could have significant consequences for future challenges to the federal ban
and to the bans of the various states. 
T
HE 2007 U.S. SUPREME COURT decision in Gonzales v. Carhart
[Carhart II]  would seem to end the long fight over partial-birth1
abortion. Ever since the 1992 disclosure of the details of the
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 Congressional Finding 14(L), in notes following 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. V 2000).2
This same descriptive phrase was used earlier by the first court to rule on the
enforceablity of a state partial-birth abortion ban. Evans v. Kelly, 977 F. Supp. 1283,
1319 n.38 (E.D. Mich. 1997). An earlier decision barred enforcement of an Ohio
statute that no doubt was motivated by the partial-birth controversy, but was so
drafted that it cannot accurately be called a partial-birth abortion ban. See Women’s
Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1063 (S.D. Ohio 1995),
aff'd, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997); James Bopp, Jr. & Curtis R. Cook, “Partial-Birth
Abortion: The Final Frontier of Abortion Jurisprudence,” 14 Issues in Law &
Medicine 3, 5 n.4 (1998). 
 Gallup polls show that support for bans rose from fifty-seven percent to seventy3
percent between 1996 and 2003. Kenneth L. Woodward, “What’s In A Name? The
New York Times on ‘Partial-Birth’ Abortion,” 19 Notre Dame Journal of Legal Ethics
& Public Policy 427, 433 n.13 (2005). Polls showed that a majority of self-identified
pro-choice respondents also favored bans. Id. 
 By 2000, at least thirty states had banned the procedure. See Stenberg v. Carhart,4
530 U.S. 914, 979 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). For the history of the Federal
Ban, see infra note 8. 
 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 5
 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Roe as modified by Casey will hereinafter be referred to as6
Roe/Casey. 
 530 U.S. 914 (2000). Carhart I will hereinafter be used to refer to the Stenberg7
decision. 
 Federal partial-birth abortion bans were passed “by wide margins” in 1996 and8
1997, but both were vetoed by President Clinton. Id. at 994 n.11 (Thomas, J.,
partial-birth procedure, which Congress later described as “gruesome
and inhumane,”  the majority of Americans, both pro-choice and2
pro-life, have favored prohibiting it.  While ban proponents3
experienced widespread success in enacting partial-birth abortion
bans,  almost all were stricken as unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade,4 5
as modified by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey.  The defining moment was the Supreme Court’s 2000 decision6
in Stenberg v. Carhart [Carhart I],  which disallowed Nebraska’s ban7
on partial-birth abortion. Carhart II, however, upheld a Federal Ban,8
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dissenting). The third Congressional ban, signed by President Bush as the Partial
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, passed the House by 281-142, Sheryl Gay Stolberg,
“Bill Banning“Abortion Procedure Advances,” The New York Times, Oct. 3, 2003,
at A24, and the Senate by 64-34. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Senate Approves Bill to
Prohibit Type of Abortion,” The New York Times, Oct. 22, 2003, at A1. The law is
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. V 2000) (hereinafter referred to as the Federal
Ban).
 The approved Federal Ban also shows the states how to craft bans to survive9
constitutional challenge.
 See, e.g., Fundraising Letter, Americans United for Life (June 7, 2007) (on file with10
author) (stating that Carhart II “paves the way for states to pass significant new
restrictions on abortion”).
 See, e.g., Randy Beck, “Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule,” 10311
Northwestern University Law Review 249 (2009) (arguing that Carhart II erodes the
significance of viability in abortion jurisprudence); Steven G. Calabresi, “Substantive
Due Process after Gonzales v. Carhart,” 106 Michigan Law Review 1517 (2008)
(discussing the decision’s impact on substantive due process jurisprudence); David
H. Gans, “Severability as Judicial Lawmaking,” 76 George Washington Law Review
639, 641 (2008) (citing the decision as evidence of the increasing significance of
severability doctrine to Supreme Court jurisprudence); B. Jessie Hill, “The
Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two
Doctrines,” 86 Texas Law Review 277 (2007) (arguing that the decision is a step
toward reconciling pre-existing different approaches to the right to make medical
treatment choices).
 See, e.g., Barry A. Bostrom, “Gonzales v. Carhart,” 23 Issues in Law & Medicine12
89 (2007); Richard S. Myers, “The Supreme Court and Abortion: The Implications
of Gonzales v. Carhart (2007),” in Life and Learning XVII (2007) (Proceedings of
the Seventeenth University for Life Conference). 
thus prohibiting the partial-birth procedure nationwide.  Why, then,9
isn’t it time to move on to other issues in the continuing national
controversy over abortion? 
Some indeed are shifting their emphasis. Advocacy groups have
wondered what Carhart II portends for other abortion restrictions.10
Some scholars have pondered its implications for other legal issues.11
But many still focus upon Carhart II itself. While the decision does not
lack supporters,  its more numerous critics have argued, among other12
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 See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, “Constitutional Humility,” 76 University of13
Cincinnati Law Review  23, 40 n.118 (2007); Martha C. Nussbaum, “Foreward:
Constitutions and Capabilities: ‘Perception’ Against Lofty Formalism,” 121 Harvard
Law Review  4, 84 (2007) (explaining that Carhart II’s reading of Carhart I was
“bizarrely narrow”).
 See, e.g., “The Supreme Court, 2006 Term–Leading Cases,” 121 Harvard Law14
Review 185, 265-75 (2007).
 In arguing that Congress could reasonably determine that the partial-birth procedure15
“implicates...ethical and moral concerns that justify a special prohibition,” the Court
stated that it was “unexceptional to conclude some women come to regret their choice
to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.” Carhart II, 550 U.S. at
158-59. Any such regret would be “more anguished and sorrow[ful]” when “a
mother...learns...that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the
fast-developing brain of her unborn child.” Id. at 159-60.
 See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 86; Ronald Turner, “Gonzales v. Carhart16
and the Court’s ‘Women’s Regret’ Rationale,” 43 Wake Forest Law Review 1 passim
(2008) (implied throughout rather than explicitly stated). Contra Teresa Stanton
Collett, “Judicial Modesty and Abortion,” 59 South Carolina Law Review 701,
731-32 (2008).
 See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 85-87; Reva B. Siegel, “The Right’s17
Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Women-Protective Antiabortion
Argument,” 57 Duke Law Journal 1641 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, “Sex Equality
Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional
Expression,” 56 Emory Law Journal 815, 837 (2007). 
 Carhart II involved a facial challenge to the Federal Ban. The Court suggested that18
an as-applied challenge might be successful under appropriate circumstances. Carhart
things, (1) that Carhart II is inconsistent with Carhart I;  (2) that the13
Court granted undue deference to the Congressional Findings of Fact
underlying the Federal Ban;  and (3) that a particular aspect of the14
Court’s rationale–the “regret” factor –is not only based on faulty15
evidence,  but also is demeaning to women.  16 17
Beyond this scholarly output, there is additional evidence that
Carhart II did not completely resolve the issue of partial-birth abortion
bans. The Court explicitly contemplated possible as-applied challenges
to the Federal Ban.  Moreover, federal appellate decisions subsequent18
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II, 550 U.S. at 167-68.
 Virginia’s partial-birth infanticide ban was initially invalidated, but then upheld on19
appeal. See infra notes 240-44 and accompanying text. Michigan failed in its attempts
to prohibit the procedure by creating a protected legal status for partially delivered
fetuses. See infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text. 
 Since the partial-birth abortion procedure had not been devised at the time of Roe,20
see infra note 40 and accompanying text, it is apparent that the Roe majority did not
actually have it in mind when discussing the concept of abortion. The argument here
is that the procedure is also not encompassed by Roe’s rationale. Consequently, the
term “partial-birth abortion” is a misnomer. The erroneous name in itself has helped
defeat the argument that Roe is inapplicable to the procedure. One court, for example,
referred to the fact that the legislature in question had defined partial-birth abortion
as “‘an abortion’” that encompassed certain specified conduct. Planned Parenthood
of Central N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 144 (3d Cir. 2000). Another court
emphasized that the ban in question “was intended to be codified under an abortion
section–evidencing the state’s efforts to restrict abortion access.” Causeway Med.
Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604, 613 (E.D. La. 1999), aff'd, 221 F.3d 811 (5th Cir.
2000). This Article will demonstrate that the word “abortion” following
“partial-birth” should not be allowed to mask the reality that the procedure kills a
child during its birth. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
 410 U.S. 113, 117 n.1 (1973). The Texas “abortion” definition also included21
causing “‘a premature birth,’” id., but the Court never focused on this fact. In any
event, the act of causing a premature birth would not be covered by the Federal Ban,
which requires an “overt act, other than completion of delivery, that kills the partially
delivered living fetus.” 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V 2000). 
to Carhart II already reveal disputes about whether state attempts to
prohibit the partial-birth procedure are enough like the Federal Ban to
survive constitutional challenge.  19
All of this post-Carhart II ferment ignores the most striking aspect
of the decision: the Supreme Court committed a fundamental
classification error. Despite the procedure’s name, partial-birth
abortion is not an “abortion” as that term was understood by the Roe
Court.  The Texas statute at issue in Roe defined “abortion” as20
destroying “‘the life of the fetus or embyro...in the woman’s womb.’”21
Roe is replete with language limiting its application to the duration of
a pregnancy–a state’s regulatory interests become compelling at some
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 410 U.S. at 163. 22
 Id. at 164.23
 Id. at 165. 24
 Id. at 162. 25
 In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, the plurality opinion characterized Roe26
as establishing “a constitutional framework for judging state regulation of abortion
during the entire term of pregnancy.” 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989). The framework
sought to balance state interests in protecting the fetus “against the claims of a woman
to decide for herself whether or not to abort a fetus she was carrying.” Id. Once live
birth begins, the “term of pregnancy” is essentially over. Id. Moreover, the woman is
no longer “carrying” the fetus in the conventional sense of that term. Id. 
 See infra notes 92-141 and accompanying text. Thus the term, “partial-birth27
abortion,” is an ironic misnomer. The description, “partial-birth,” undoubtedly gives
ban proponents a rhetorical edge. So much so that Newsweek Contributing Editor
Kenneth Woodward argues that The New York Times, because of its well-known
support of abortion rights, has studiously avoided using what it regards “as a toxic
term.” Woodward, supra note 3, at 436-37, 441-42. But whatever rhetorical
advantage opponents of the procedure gain by the phrase, “partial-birth” is offset by
the disadvantages of calling the procedure an “abortion.” This label no doubt
indirectly, and sometimes directly, see supra note 20, supports the erroneous
perspective that the partial-birth procedure is an abortion properly subject to Roe.
 The Court in Carhart II agrees with this characterization. See infra note 91 and28
accompanying text. “Fetus” is what biologists call an unborn human being beginning
at about eight weeks gestational age. Lennart Nilsson & Lars Hamberger, A Child Is
Born (1990), p. 91. At this developmental stage, “all the organs are already in place.
“point during pregnancy”;  a state cannot criminalize abortion22
“without regard to pregnancy stage”;  a state can regulate more “as the23
period of pregnancy lengthens.”  At “live birth,” all such constraints24
on a state’s regulatory freedom disappear, as the fetus then becomes a
person “in the whole sense.”  The Court thus thought of “abortion”25
only as an act that terminates a pregnancy at some point prior to live
birth.  Consequently, to kill a fetus during its live birth is not an26
abortion under Roe.   27
Partial-birth abortion kills a fetus during its live birth.  “‘[B]irth’28
Samuel W. Calhoun 89
Everything to be found in a fully grown human being has already been formed.” Id.
Also, “the growing organism, small as it is, looks human even if quite unlike its
parents.” Roberts Rugh & Labdrum B. Shettles, From Conception to Birth: The
Drama of Life’s Beginnings (1971), p. 39. “Fetus” thus is the technical term used for
an unborn human baby at or beyond a particular gestational age. I will therefore use
the terms “fetus” and “baby”/”child” interchangeably. This usage is supported by
Carhart II, in which the Court speaks most often of the “fetus,” 550 U.S. 124 passim
(2007), but refers also to “the unborn child,” id. at 134, 160, “the infant life,” id. at
159, and “‘the baby,’” id. at 138-39. Although using “fetus” and “baby”/”child”
synonymously is also consistent with the Latin word, “fetus,” which “simply means
‘offspring’ or ‘unborn young,’” David K. DeWolf, Book Review/Essay, 26 Gonzaga
Law Review 257, 259 n.10 (1991) (quoting American Heritage Dictionary 260
(1983)), some find it objectionable as revealing “hostility to the right Roe and Casey
secured.” Carhart II, 550 U.S at 186-87 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
 National Abortion Federation v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, 311 n.14 (2d Cir. 2006)29
(Straub, J., dissenting) (quoting Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 207 (27th
ed. 2000)), vacated, 224 Fed. Appx. 88 (2d Cir. 2007). See also Taber’s Cyclopedic
Medical Dictionary 251 (20th ed. 2001) (“[t]he act of being born; passage of a child
from the uterus”). 
 The steps of the partial-birth procedure were plainly described by Dr. Martin30
Haskell in a 1992 presentation at a National Abortion Federation meeting. This
description not only played an important role in igniting the partial-birth abortion
controversy, see infra note 40 and accompanying text, but also has been relied upon
in partial-birth abortion decisions as accurately describing the procedure. See, e.g.,
Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 138-39; Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 825-27 (D.
Neb. 2004), aff'd, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’d, Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124
(2007). Haskell spoke of grasping a “lower [fetal] extremity” with “a large grasping
forcep” and pulling it “into the vagina.” Dr. Martin Haskell, “Dilation and Extraction
for Late Second Trimester Abortions,” presented at the National Abortion Federation
Risk Management Seminar (Sept. 13, 1992) (hereinafter “Haskell Presentation”). The
surgeon then uses “his fingers to deliver the opposite lower extremity, then the torso,
the shoulders and the upper extremities.” Id. The accompanying textual sentence
makes four assertions about the state of the fetus during the partial-birth process: (1)
fully formed; (2) living; (3) intact; and (4) partially in the outside world. It is
incontestable that fetuses subjected to the partial-birth procedure are fully formed.
According to Dr. Haskell, the procedure is used “in patients 20-26 weeks in
is the ‘passage of the offspring from the uterus to the outside world.’”29
An intended step of the partial-birth procedure is forcibly to begin
pulling a fully formed, living, and intact fetus into the outside world.30
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pregnancy.” Haskell Presentation, supra. “Even at 20 weeks, doctors say, a
developing fetus appears remarkably full-formed, right down to the fingerprints.” Roy
Rivenburg, “Partial Truths,” Los Angeles Times, Apr. 2, 1997 (Life & Style), at 1.
This can be corroborated by consulting any book on fetal development. See, e.g.,
Alexander Tsiaras, From Conception to Birth: A Life Unfolds (2002). As to whether
the fetus is living, in one sense there is no reason for dispute. If the fetus is not living
at the time of the partial-birth procedure, the ban does not apply. The Federal Ban is
triggered only if “a living fetus” is delivered to a certain point and then killed by an
“overt act, other than the completion of delivery.” 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1)(A)-(B)
(Supp. V 2000). For a discussion of whether the fetus is in fact “alive” during this
process, see infra note 34 and accompanying text. Regarding intactness, Dr. Haskell
describes a two-day process to dilate the cervix prior to the partial-birth procedure.
Haskell Presentation, supra. This accomplishes sufficient dilation for the fetus’s body
to be extracted intact, but usually is inadequate to allow the fetus’s skull “to pass
through.” Id. See Rivenburg, supra (the doctor “pulls out the body except for the
head, which is too large to pass without injuring the woman”). For information on the
extent to which the doctor brings the fetus outside the woman’s body, see infra note
32 and accompanying text. 
 The Court in Carhart II explicitly stated that partial-birth abortion involves31
“birth”–the procedure’s effect is to kill “a fetus...just inches before completion of the
birth process.” 550 U.S. at 157. The Court later found that Congress was reasonable
to conclude that the partial-birth procedure “‘perverts a process during which life is
brought into the world.’” Id. at 160. 
 The Federal Ban only applies if “in the case of a head-first presentation, the entire32
fetal head is outside the body of the mother, or, in the case of a breech presentation,
any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother.” 18 U.S.C.
§1531(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V 2000). Breech presentations [feet first] are the most
common. Thus, “[i]n the usual...[partial-birth procedure,] the fetus’ head lodges in the
cervix [see infra note 207], and dilation is insufficient to allow it to pass.” Carhart
II, 550 U.S. at 138; see id. at 150. For evidence that in this situation the required
degree of separation from the mother commonly occurs, see infra note 208 and
accompanying text. 
 Professor Cynthia Gorney quotes the following as a “fairly accurate [technical]33
summation” of the partial-birth procedure: “[T]he abortionist uses forceps to pull a
living baby feet-first through the birth canal until the baby’s body is exposed, leaving
The procedure thus initiates a live birth process.  Before the fetus has31
fully emerged, but when either its head or half its lower body is outside
the woman’s body,  its skull is collapsed.  Because the partial-birth32 33
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only the head just within the uterus. The abortionist then forces surgical scissors into
the base of the baby’s skull, creating an incision through which he inserts a suction
tube to evacuate the brain tissue from the baby’s skull. The evacuation of this tissue
causes the skull to collapse, allowing the baby’s head to be pulled from the birth
canal.” Cynthia Gorney, “Gambling With Abortion,” Harper’s, Nov. 2004, at 34.
Gorney does not explain why she finds this description only “fairly” accurate. It
certainly comports with Dr. Haskell’s explanation of the partial-birth procedure:
“[T]he surgeon...forces the scissors into the base of the skull...[and] spreads [them]
to enlarge the opening. The surgeon removes the scissors and introduces a suction
catheter into this hole and evacuates the skull contents.” Haskell Presentation, supra
note 30. Haskell’s description, in conjunction with his account of the prior partial
delivery of the fetus, see supra note 30, makes it clear that the procedure does in fact
kill, as Gorney’s account portrays and as Congress has found, a “partially-born child.”
See Gorney, supra; Congressional Findings 14(H) & (K), in notes following 18
U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. V 2000).
 Early in the partial-birth controversy, some ban opponents argued that anesthesia34
given to the woman kills the fetus before its skull is collapsed. These included
nationally syndicated columnist Ellen Goodman. Ellen Goodman, “Pro-life
Lawmakers Aren’t Looking at All the Pictures,” Roanoke Times, Nov. 14, 1995, at
A7. Kate Michelman, then President of the National Abortion Rights Action League,
stated that because anesthesia has already killed the fetus, “it is not true that they’re
born partially. This is a gross distortion, and it’s really a disservice to the public to
say this.” Effects of Anesthesia During a Partial-Birth Abortion: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
7 (1996) (transcript of Michelman radio statement). In fact, the early fetal demise
argument was the “gross distortion.” Anesthesiologists “blasted” it as “scientific
bunk.” Rivenburg, supra note 30 (the article later states that the claim has “been
debunked”). See Gorney, supra note 33, at 41 (characterizing as a “misstep” and
“wrong” ban opponents’ argument that “the fetus is always dead by the time the
doctor begins” the partial-birth procedure). 
 This argument has appeared from time to time during the partial-birth controversy,35
e.g., Bopp & Cook, supra note 2, at 27-28; infra note 60, but evaluating it is beyond
procedure kills a fetus during its live birth,  it lies outside the34
constitutional right recognized in Roe. Courts have therefore been
mistaken to rely upon Roe in evaluating legislative bans.
It is important to stress the modesty of the foregoing thesis. I do
not argue here that the partially born are constitutional persons under
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Nor do I argue here that the partially35
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the scope of this article. 
 Such an argument might be based, for example, on the “created equal” and36
“inalienable rights” language of the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration
of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 37
 Some courts that have rejected the “Roe is inapplicable” argument have explicitly38
recognized judges’ duty not to substitute their own policy choices for those of the
legislature–a law should be overturned only if it is clearly unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood of Central N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2000);
Little Rock Family Planning Services v. Jegley, No. LR-C-97-581, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22325, at *38 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 13, 1998), aff’d, 192 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 1999).
The sincerity of judicial efforts to apply the Constitution correctly in the partial-birth
abortion context is not in question. Nonetheless, this article posits that to the extent
that courts have applied Roe to evaluate partial-birth abortion bans, they have
inappropriately limited the freedom of the people, acting through their elected
representatives, to curtail the partial-birth procedure. 
born are a class of humanity otherwise intrinsically entitled to legal
protection.  My claim is much more limited: because the partial-birth36
procedure is not an abortion, a legislative body unencumbered by
Roe/Casey can appropriately choose to ban it. 
Part I will show that the “Roe is inapplicable” argument appears
throughout the fight to ban the partial-birth procedure. The view was
communicated to Congress on multiple occasions by prominent legal
authorities. It was also asserted numerous times in ban litigation. To
overlook this reality is to miss an important aspect of the partial-birth
abortion controversy. 
Part II will demonstrate that the constitutional right to abortion
choice conferred by Roe does not encompass partial-birth abortion. Roe
strongly implied that it does not apply to killing a baby during its birth.
The partial-birth process kills a baby while being born.  It is therefore37
wrong to apply Roe/Casey to evaluate partial-birth abortion bans.
Doing so illegitimately constrains lawmakers’ right to prohibit the
partial-birth procedure.  38
Part III will discuss the consequences of recognizing that
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 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.39
 According to the Supreme Court, the procedure “gained public notoriety when, in40
1992, Dr. Martin Haskell gave a presentation describing his method of performing the
operation.” Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124, 138 (2007). See Rivenburg, supra note 30 (the
debate arose when “[n]ot long after” Haskell “presented...[his] how-to paper[,]...a
copy...found its way to the National Right to Life Committee”). Professor Cynthia
Gorney gives 1993 as the start of “intense public argument,” the year that “a
physician’s published description [undoubtedly Dr. Haskell’s]... was reprinted in
right-to-life journals.” Cynthia Gorney, Articles of Faith: A Frontline History of the
Abortion Wars (1998, 2000), p. 522. 
 See supra notes 4, 8 and accompanying text. The extent of public opposition to the41
partial-birth procedure is demonstrated not only by the proliferation of bans, but also
by some states’ multiple attempts to pass a ban that would survive constitutional
scrutiny. One example is Virginia. Its 1998 ban of “partial-birth abortion” was
invalidated in Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore, 55 F. Supp. 2d 441
(E.D. Va. 1999), aff’d, 224 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2000). In 2003, Virginia again tried to
ban the procedure by criminalizing “partial birth infanticide.” Richmond Medical
Center v. Hicks, 301 F. Supp. 2d 499 (E.D. Va. 2004), aff’d, 409 F.3d 619 (4th Cir.
2005). This statute was also invalidated. Id. The State successfully sought certiorari
from the Supreme Court, which, due to Carhart II, vacated the Fourth Circuit
decision and remanded the case. Herring v. Richmond Medical Center for Women,
partial-birth abortion is not an abortion under Roe. Most importantly,
the partial-birth procedure is not entitled to the same constitutional
protection accorded to abortion. Partial-birth abortion bans should
therefore be scrutinized under a rational basis standard, not the criteria
applicable to abortion legislation. Applying the appropriate
constitutional test could very well have dispositive impact if the
Federal Ban is ever subjected to an as-applied challenge.  Applying the39
proper standard could also have implications for evaluating state
partial-birth abortion legislation in the wake of Carhart II. 
I. HISTORY
Partial-birth abortion burst into the public consciousness in the early to
mid-1990s.  Widespread abhorrence quickly led to legislative bans of40
the procedure.  Legal challenges to the bans followed just as swiftly.41 42
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550 U.S. 901 (2007). Virginia initially failed in defending its ban, but on appeal was
ultimately successful. Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Herring, 527 F.3d 128
(4th Cir. 2008), rev’d on reh’g, Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Herring, 570
F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 2009) (en banc). See infra notes 240-44 and accompanying text.
Michigan’s opposition to the partial-birth procedure perhaps surpasses Virginia’s. For
an account of its dogged efforts to enact a prohibition, including a step requiring the
direct involvement of the people of Michigan, see infra note 245. 
 For an early, comprehensive assessment of bans’ constitutionality under the42
Roe/Casey standard, see Ann MacLean Massie, “So-Called ‘Partial-Birth Abortion’
Bans: Bad Medicine? Maybe. Bad Law? Definitely!” 59 University of Pittsburgh Law
Review 301 (1998). Massie mentions the argument that the partial-birth procedure is
not an abortion, id. at 363, but does not discuss it.
 In addition to claims of unconstitutionality, ban opponents tried in other ways to43
quell the widespread outcry against the partial-birth procedure. Some used factual
distortions. The most notable example was revealed when Ron Fitzsimmons,
executive director of the National Coalition of Abortion Providers, admitted “that he
lied in earlier statements when he said...[that the procedure] is rare and performed
primarily to save the lives or fertility of women bearing severely malformed babies.”
David Stout, “An Abortion Rights Advocate Says He Lies About Procedure,” The
New York Times, Feb. 26, 1997, at A11. In fact, “[i]n the vast majority of cases, the
procedure is performed on a healthy mother with a healthy fetus.” Id. 
 See, e.g., Causeway Medical Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604, 615-19 (E.D. La.44
1999), aff’d on other grounds, 221 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2000); Planned Parenthood of
Greater Iowa, Inc. v. Miller, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1164-66 (S.D. Iowa 1998), aff'd
on other grounds, 195 F.3d 386 (8th Cir. 1999); Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283,
1304-11 (E.D. Mich. 1997). 
 An undue burden “exists if a regulation’s ‘purpose or effect is to place a substantial45
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains
viability.’” Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 146 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992)). The principal argument that
partial-birth abortion bans constitute an undue burden is that they prohibit, in addition
to the partial-birth procedure, the more common D&E method of abortion. See infra
text accompanying notes 152, 197. See, e.g., Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F. Supp. 2d
1024, 1033-35 (W.D. Ky. 1998), aff’d, 224 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2000); Evans, 977 F.
Supp. at 1315-19. The undue burden critique also sometimes is based on the lack of
Critics had three principal arguments for the unconstitutionality of a
ban : (1) vagueness,  (2) imposition of an undue burden on a43 44
woman’s right to obtain a pre-viability abortion,  and (3) lack of a45
Samuel W. Calhoun 95
a health exception. See infra note 46. 
 The health exception argument is premised in the requirement that even46
post-viability abortion regulations must contain a health exception. See Carhart I, 530
U.S. at 929-30. Concerning partial-birth abortion bans, the absence of a health
exception has sometimes been relied upon as an independent constitutional
deficiency, e.g., Causeway Medical Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604, 613-14 (E.D.
La. 1999), aff’d, 221 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2000); Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa,
Inc. v. Miller, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1167-68 (S.D. Iowa 1998), aff’d, 195 F.3d 386
(8th Cir. 1999); and sometimes as an element in an undue burden analysis. E.g.,
Planned Parenthood of Central N.J. v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d 478, 501-03 (D.N.J.
1998), aff’d sub nom. on other grounds, Planned Parenthood of Central N.J. v.
Farmer, 220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000). The presence of a health exception was a key
factor in perhaps the only decision upholding a state partial-birth abortion ban
subsequent to Carhart I. See Women’s Medical Professional Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d
436, 444-50 (6th Cir. 2003). Carhart II held that the lack of a health exception in the
Federal Ban was constitutionally permissible. 550 U.S. at 161-66. 
 Between 1996 and 1997, the late pro-choice Senator Patrick Moynihan’s opinion47
of the partial-birth procedure changed from the latter to the former. In 1996, he stated
that the procedure was “‘as close to infanticide as anything I have come upon in our
judiciary.’” Barbara Vobejda & David Brown, “Harsh Details Shift Tenor of
Abortion Fight; Both Sides Bend Facts On Late-Term Procedure,” The Washington
Post, Sept. 17, 1996, at A01. By 1997, based on Ron Fitzsimmons’s confession of
how he had lied about the procedure [see supra note 43], Moynihan had become
convinced that the procedure “is infanticide, and one would be too many.” See Meet
the Press (NBC television broadcast Mar. 3, 1997) (transcript on file with the author).
 Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 609.48
health exception.  Ban proponents contested these three points, but46
soon introduced a new argument pertinent to the Roe/Casey-based
attack. They argued that Roe/Casey were inapplicable because the
proscribed procedure, although labeled as a type of abortion, actually
is outside the Roe conception of what an abortion entails. The
procedure kills a partially born baby, i.e., one in the process of being
born. It therefore actually either is or nearly is infanticide.47
Determining the precise origin of the “Roe is inapplicable”
perspective is difficult. Although described in a 1999 federal district
court opinion as “a unique new argument in abortion litigation,”  the48
Life and Learning XVIII96
 See, e.g., Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 496-98.49
 Examples include a professional journal article, see Bopp & Cook, supra note 2,50
at 25-27, and a failed Washington State ballot initiative to ban partial-birth
infanticide. See Jill R. Radloff, Note, “Partial-Birth Infanticide: An Alternative Legal
and Medical Route to Banning Partial-Birth Procedures,” 83 Minnesota Law Review
1555, 1556-57 (1999).
 See “AFA [American Family Association] Law Center defends Arizona ban with51
novel argument,” AFA Journal, Jan. 1998, at 18. 
 See Planned Parenthood of S. Arizona v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369, 1377 (D.52
Ariz. 1997). In addition to this assertion in a lawsuit, the “Roe is inapplicable”
argument was made several times at a March 1997 Congressional Hearing. See
“Partial-Birth Abortion: The Truth: Joint Hearing Before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, “105th Cong. 53, 108 (1997) [hereinafter March 1997 Hearing] (Prepared
Statement and testimony, respectively, of Douglas Johnson, representing the National
Right to Life Committee); id. at 72 (testimony of Helen Alvare, representing the
National Conference of Catholic Bishops); id. at 161 (Letter from Prof. Douglas
Kmiec to Sen. Orin G. Hatch & Rep. Henry J. Hyde (Mar. 10, 1997)). The argument
was also submitted as part of Congressional floor debate on partial-birth abortion. See
infra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 “Origins and Scope of Roe v. Wade: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the53
Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary,” 104th Cong. 47 (1996)
[hereinafter April 1996 Hearing] (Prepared Statement of Professor Mary Ann
Glendon). The “Roe is inapplicable” argument was also suggested by Helen Alvare,
representing the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, on a television broadcast.
60 Minutes: Partial-Birth Abortion (CBS television broadcast June 2, 1996) (the
procedure “is not truly abortion as the Supreme Court addressed that issue in Roe v.
Wade”).
theory clearly had surfaced by 1998, in court  and elsewhere.  One49 50
advocacy group claims that the “Roe is inapplicable” argument
originated in its 1997 defense of Arizona’s ban.  This might well be51
its first judicial mention,  but the theory clearly predates 1997. The52
approach was asserted at a 1996 House Subcommittee Hearing by
Harvard Law Professor Mary Ann Glendon.  The earliest mentions of53
the argument that I have found come from November 1995 by law
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 “The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995: Hearing Before the Senate54
Committee on the Judiciary,” 104th Cong. 170, 174, 186, 194, 198 (1995)
[hereinafter November 1995 Hearing] (testimony of Prof. Douglas Kmiec); id. at 231
(Letter from Prof. Douglas Kmiec to Sens. Orrin G. Hatch & Patrick Leahy (Nov. 27,
1995)). 
 Id. at 345-46 (Written Testimony of Prof. David Smolin). 55
 As was true for Professor Mary Ann Glendon, see supra note 53 and accompanying56
text, other law professors eventually accepted this new argument. See infra note 75
and accompanying text. 
 Telephone Interview with Doug Kmiec, Professor of Law, Pepperdine University57
School of Law (Aug. 5, 2008) (also the source for the other statements in the text
accompanying this footnote). Professor Kmiec was also influenced by the fact that
Roe explicitly failed to address a Texas statute that criminalized killing a baby in the
process of being born. Id.; see infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text. 
professors Doug Kmiec  and David Smolin  at a Senate Judiciary54 55
Committee Hearing.  56
Professor Kmiec came to the view that Roe does not cover the
partial-birth procedure largely through thinking about the meaning of
the word “abortion.”  His instincts told him that abortion means the57
termination of a pregnancy, and a search of numerous medical
dictionaries confirmed this initial understanding. Thus, an abortion can
occur only during an ongoing pregnancy. But doesn’t pregnancy end
with the beginning of the birth process? How, then, can the partial-birth
procedure be an abortion? To Kmiec, the answer depended on what
counts as the beginning of birth. Does it mean only a birth begun in the
natural way, by God? Or does it also include a birth begun by man’s
intervention? He determined that, in this secular age, a man-begun
process was also a birth, and thus that Roe was inapplicable.
Professor Smolin’s submission to the November 1995 Hearing is
especially interesting because of his interaction with Congress a few
months earlier. In June 1995, at the first Congressional Hearing on a
proposed federal ban, he submitted a written statement, thus perhaps
becoming the first law professor formally to communicate to Congress
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 Professor Smolin was scheduled to testify in person, but time constraints made that58
impossible. “Partial-Birth Abortion: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee,” 104th Cong. 97-102 (1995)
[hereinafter June 1995 Hearing].
 Id. at 98. 59
 November 1995 Hearing, supra note 54, at 345. Although Smolin has no specific60
recollection of why his views changed during this five-month period, Telephone
Interview with David Smolin, Professor of Law, Cumberland Law School, Samford
University (Aug. 5, 2008), the two statements themselves show how his thinking
evolved. In June, Smolin argued that although Roe held that the “unborn” are not
constitutional persons, a partially born infant might nonetheless have that protected
status. June 1995 Hearing, supra note 58, at 100. He relied in part upon the fact that
Texas’s parturition statute, which criminalized killing a baby while being born, was
not challenged in Roe. Id.; see infra notes 103-105 and accompanying text. Smolin
did not emphasize the significance of this assertion–his discussion of constitutional
personhood appears as an interlude in the middle of an argument that a partial-birth
abortion ban can survive scrutiny under a Roe/Casey analysis. June 1995 Hearing,
supra note 58, at 100. By November, Smolin had revised his written statement to
highlight the constitutional personhood argument. It now came first, as a separate
subsection. November 1995 Hearing, supra note 54, at 344-45. Smolin’s second
argument, missing from his June statement, but again relying on the fact that Roe “did
not rule on the constitutionality of the Texas statute prohibiting the destruction of an
unborn child during childbirth,” was that the partial-birth procedure does not
“trigger[] the abortion liberty.” Id. at 345. Thus, even if fetuses are not constitutional
persons, a partial-birth abortion ban must only satisfy “the rational basis test.” Id. 
 See, e.g., Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2002, Hearing Before the61
on the subject.  Smolin stated that “[t]he proposed prohibition of this58
particular method of abortion constitutes, in constitutional terms, a
regulation of abortion.”  Five months later, however, he argued that59
killing a partially extracted infant “has never been held [to be] within
the constitutional right or liberty to abort.... Thus, the entire
constitutional regime created by Roe...and...Casey is...irrelevant to the
constitutional analysis of a ban on partial-birth abortions.”60
Regardless of its exact origin, the “Roe is inapplicable” theory has
persisted in the battle over partial-birth abortion bans. Since 1999, the
argument has on occasion appeared in legislative documents,  but has61
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Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. 164-65 (2002) (written testimony of Douglas Johnson).
 Many partial-birth abortion ban decisions do not mention the theory, e.g., Planned62
Parenthood v. Miller, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (S.D. Iowa 1998), aff’d, 195 F.3d 386 (8th
Cir. 1999); Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (W.D. Ky. 1998), aff’d, 224
F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2000). Such decisions also have a significant role in any account
of the “Roe is inapplicable” perspective–as examples of the flaw currently
undermining partial-birth abortion jurisprudence. 
 See, e.g., infra note 90 and accompanying text. 63
 Judge Chester Straub “do[es] not believe that a woman’s right to terminate her64
pregnancy under Roe...extends to the destruction of a child that is substantially
outside of her body.” National Abortion Federation v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, 298
(2d Cir. 2006) (Straub, J., dissenting), vacated, 224 Fed. Appx. 88 (2d Cir. 2007). See
id. at 312. While this acknowledgment would seem to compel the conclusion that Roe
is inapplicable to the partial-birth procedure, Judge Straub would still apply Roe, but
in a way that would uphold the Federal Ban. See id. at 310-13. A 2003 House
Judiciary Committee Report makes the same mistake. The Report first states that
“partial-birth abortion should not implicate...[the abortion] right because the
pregnancy ended once the birth process began and the right to terminate one’s
pregnancy by aborting one’s unborn child does not include an independent right to
assure the death of that child regardless of its location to the mother.” H.R. Rep. No.
108-58, at 21-22 (2003). But rather than arguing that Roe is thus inapplicable to the
partial-birth procedure, the Report says only that “the government [therefore] has a
heightened interest in protecting the life of the partially-born child.” Id. at 22. 
 An interesting case study is the history of the “Roe is inapplicable” argument in65
Virginia. The State in 1998 had tried unsuccessfully to ban “partial-birth abortion.”
In the ensuing litigation, the State asserted what the district judge called “the rather
unusual view that Roe...[is] inapplicable because...the Supreme Court did not
announce constitutional protections to abortions where ‘the child is partially born.’”
Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d 795, 822 (E.D. Va.
1998). The court “decline[d] the State’s invitation to circumvent the requirements of
Roe,” id., a rejection it reiterated in a later phase of the case. Richmond Medical
surfaced most often in judicial proceedings. Numerous federal district
and circuit court opinions discuss the theory,  and it has been62
advanced in numerous briefs filed with various courts.  Although the63
approach has in part convinced at least one individual judge,  courts64
have unanimously rejected it.  Some have done so by totally ignoring65
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Center for Women v. Gilmore, 55 F. Supp. 2d 441, 480 (E.D. Va. 1999), aff'd, 224
F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). In 2003, Virginia tried again to ban the
partial-birth procedure, this time making its policy rationale clearer by now seeking
to ban “partial birth infanticide.” A different federal district judge invalidated the new
statute, once more rejecting Virginia’s attempt “to establish a line [demarking a
State’s ability to prohibit abortion] in ‘terms of whether a fetus was in the process of
being born.’” Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Hicks, 301 F. Supp. 2d 499,
515 (E.D. Va. 2004). The Fourth Circuit affirmed, without explicitly referring to the
State’s argument that Roe is inapplicable to the partial birth procedure. See Richmond
Medical Center for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2005), vacated &
remanded, 550 U.S. 901 (2007), aff’d sub nom. Richmond Medical Center for
Women v. Herring, 527 F.3d 128 (4th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 570 F.3d 165 (4th Cir.
2009). The Fourth Circuit ultimately upheld the Virginia ban based upon Roe/Casey
as applied in Carhart II, with no reference to the “Roe is inapplicable” argument. See
Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 2009).
 A prime example is the Supreme Court in both Carhart I and Carhart II. See infra66
notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
 Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz., Inc. v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369, 1377 (D. Ariz.67
1997). 
 Causeway Medical Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604, 615 (E.D. La. 1999), aff’d,68
221 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 Id. at 619.69
the argument,  but others have openly scoffed. Courts have66
characterized the theory in various ways: unsupported by precedent ;67
“a conceptual theory that...has no relationship to fact, law or
medicine” ; a “back door effort to limit...[the abortion] right” ;68 69
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 Northland Family Planning Clinic v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 346 (6th Cir. 2007), cert.70
denied, 128 S. Ct. 873 (2008). In affirming the district court’s denial of permissive
intervention to Standing Together To Oppose Partial-Birth-Abortion (STTOP), the
court characterized STTOP’s brief as taking “an ideological approach to the litigation
rather than attempting to argue for the...[challenged law’s] validity under relevant
Supreme Court precedent.” Id. And what was STTOP’s principal argument? That Roe
does “not address the legal status of...transitional person[s],” i.e., human beings in the
process of being born. See Final Reply Brief of Proposed Intervenor/Appellant, 2006
WL 3223977, at 14.
 R.I. Medical Society v. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp. 2d 288, 304 (D.R.I. 1999), aff’d,71
239 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 Planned Parenthood of Central N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 143 (3d Cir. 2000).72
 Id. at 144. 73
 Id. Judge Barry also brands as “mischaracterization” a standard, authenticated74
description of the partial-birth procedure. See id. at 140. It thus is ironic that she
herself fails to grasp what the procedure actually involves. See infra notes 206-09 and
accompanying text.
 Letter from sixty-three Law Professors to Sen. Orrin Hatch (May 8, 1997), in 14375
Congressional Record 8807 (1997).
ideological ; and “specious.”  Third Circuit Judge Maryanne Barry70 71
had an extraordinarily negative reaction to the argument. In a span of
two pages, she characterized it as (1) “based on semantic machinations,
irrational line-drawing, and an obvious attempt to inflame public
opinion instead of [on] logic or medical evidence” ; (2) “a desperate72
attempt to circumvent over twenty-five years of abortion
jurisprudence” ; and (3) “an effort to cloud the issues.”  73 74
This host of derogatory comments suggests that the “Roe is
inapplicable” argument is frivolous, if not deliberately obfuscating. In
fact, courts have been far too dismissive. Part II will demonstrate that
sixty-three law professors were correct in stating to Congress that
“[t]he destruction of human beings who are partially born is...entirely
outside the legal framework established in Roe v. Wade and Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.”  Courts that have rejected the “Roe is75
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 This characterization of partial-birth abortion is not only justified by what the76
process in fact entails, see supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text and infra notes
142-86 and accompanying text, but also has been accepted by the Court in Carhart
II. See infra note 91 and accompanying text. For an eloquent denunciation of the idea
of constitutional protection for the partial-birth procedure, see Richmond Medical
Center for Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165, 180-83 (4th Cir. 2009) (Wilkinson, J.,
concurring). 
 National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 479 (S.D.N.Y.77
2004), aff’d sub nom. National Abortion Federation v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278 (2d
Cir. 2006), vacated, 224 Fed. Appx. 88 (2d Cir. 2007). Cynthia Gorney writes that
“[a] tone of queasy resignation permeates parts of [the district judge’s] ruling
[invalidating the Federal Ban], as though the judge were still reeling from
descriptions of things that appear to be constitutionally protected despite being
gruesome and brutal and so forth.” Gorney, supra note 33, at 45.
 See John T. Noonan, Jr., “The Root and Branch of Roe v. Wade,” 63 Nebraska Law78
Review 668, 668-69 (1984). Slavery was not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution,
but its “legitimate presence” in American society was implicitly acknowledged by the
“three-fifths clause,” the “slave-trade clause,” and the “fugitive-slave clause.” See
Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and
Politics (1978), pp. 26-27. 
inapplicable” argument have inappropriately limited the people’s
power to express their corporate repudiation of the partial-birth
procedure. 
II. MISAPPLYING ROE
In evaluating whether Roe/Casey protect partial-birth abortion, an
initial response might be to decry the very idea of constitutional
protection for killing a baby during its birth  via what one federal76
judge has called “a gruesome, brutal, barbaric, and uncivilized medical
procedure.”  This protest would be understandable, but misguided.77
Judge John Noonan has reminded us that the long-protected life of
American slavery shows that moral depravity does not necessarily
mean the absence of constitutional status.  The proper legal question78
is whether Roe, properly interpreted, encompasses the partial-birth
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 Roe itself, of course, is highly controversial, but the question of its correctness, i.e.,79
whether the Constitution, properly interpreted, confers a constitutional right to an
abortion, is beyond the scope of this article. 
 See infra note 85.80
 Making accurate generalizations about state laws protecting infants born alive81
following an attempted abortion is complicated. Some such laws are officially named
“Born-Alive Infant Protection Acts” and were enacted in the early 2000s more or less
contemporaneously with the similarly named Federal Act. See, e.g., 5 Ill. Comp. Stat.
Ann. 70/1-36 (Supp. 2008) (modeled after the Federal Act); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§333.1071.73 (2008) (not modeled after the Federal Act). Some states, however,
protected born-alive infants long before the recent flurry of legislation. Pennsylvania,
for example, as part of its 1974 Abortion Control Act, punished as second degree
murder one who, “with intent to do so, ...intentionally and wilfully take[s] the life of
a premature infant aborted alive.” 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6604 (1977). In 1978, this
statute was repealed with the entire 1974 Act, but was replaced in 1982 by a provision
in Pennsylvania’s new Abortion Control Act entitled “Infanticide”: “The law of this
Commonwealth shall not be construed to imply that any human being born alive in
the course of or as a result of an abortion or pregnancy termination, no matter what
may be that human being’s chance of survival, is not a person under the Constitution
and laws of this Commonwealth.” 18 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 3212(a) (2000). For other
examples of this early protection for born-alive infants, see Mont. Code Ann. §
50-20-108(1) (2007) (entitled “Protection of premature infants born alive”); and Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 28-331 (1995) (entitled “Care and treatment of child aborted”).
 The legislation, at least to federal lawmakers, was considered essential “‘to82
establish...a limit to...[the] sweeping right to abortion’” recognized in Carhart I. See
Roger Bryon, “Children of a Lesser Law: The Failure of the Born-Alive Infants
Protection Act and a Plan for Its Redemption,” 19 Regent University Law Review
275, 278 (2006-07). The Federal Act was also motivated by the decision in Planned
Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000), which
alarmed lawmakers by stressing a woman’s intent in defining “the scope of her right
procedure within the constitutional right to an abortion.79
The theoretical concept that Roe has only a limited reach
presumably is not controversial. For example, no one would argue that
the decision protects a woman’s right to kill any of her children under
the age of two. Another example of Roe’s limited scope is provided by
Born-Alive Infants Protection Acts. These Acts, at both the federal80
and state  level, are a legislative response to live-birth abortions.81 82
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to destroy her offspring.” National Abortion Federation v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278,
311 n.14 (2d Cir. 2006) (Straub, J., dissenting), vacated, 224 Fed. Appx. 88 (2d Cir.
2007). See infra note 183.
 Liz Jeffries & Rick Edmonds, “The Dreaded Complication,” Philadelphia Inquirer83
(Aug. 2, 1981) (Special Reprint Edition). At the time, the Center for Disease Control
estimated “400 to 500 abortion live births” each year in the United States. Id. The
incidence of live births, of course, depends chiefly on the abortion technique used. A
D&E abortion [see infra note 152 and accompanying text] is “foolproof,” i.e., it
“never, ever results in live births.” Id. Prostaglandin instillation, on the other hand,
can produce a live birth rate as high as eight percent. Nancy K. Rhoden, “The New
Neonatal Dilemma: Live Births From Late Abortions,” 72 Georgetown Law Review
1451, 1458 (1984). Live births following abortions are a continuing phenomenon. See
Shantala Vadeyar, Tracey A. Johnston, Mary Sidebotham & Jean Sands, “Neonatal
Death Following Termination of Pregnancy,” 112 BJOG 1159 (Aug. 2005) (a study
of neonatal death following abortion in thirty-one cases over six years in a certain
medical region in England).
 Jeffries & Edmonds, supra note 83. See Bryon, supra note 82, at 275-76 (giving84
real-life examples of born infants “killed or left to die” following abortion attempts).
There sometimes is an attempt to provide medical care to fetuses born alive after an
attempted abortion. See Magda Denes, In Necessity and Sorrow: Life and Death in
an Abortion Hospital (1976), p. 39. 
 For example, the Federal Born-Alive Infants Protection Act defines “‘person,’85
‘human being,’ ‘child,’ and ‘individual’” as including “every infant member of the
species homo sapiens who is born alive at any stage of development.” 1 U.S.C. § 8(a)
(2006). “‘[B]orn alive’” includes (but is not limited to) an infant who, following
“complete expulsion or extraction” from its mother, “breathes or has a beating
heart...regardless of whether the expulsion or extraction occurs as a result of natural
or induced labor, cesarean section, or induced abortion.” Id. at § 8(b). Bryon, supra
note 82, argues that the Federal Act in fact confers very little, if any, actual protection
on such infants. 
 Although the declaration obviously does not bind a court, Michigan’s Born Alive86
Infant Protection Act states: “A woman’s right to terminate pregnancy ends when the
Some abortion procedures result in infants born alive.  Abortionists83
nonetheless have either directly killed these newborn infants or left
them unattended to die.  Born-Alive Infants Protection Acts confer84
legal personhood status on such babies.  This legislation is unaffected85
by Roe/Casey.86
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pregnancy is terminated. It is not an infringement on a woman’s right to terminate her
pregnancy for the state to assert its interest in protecting a newborn whose live birth
occurs as the result of an abortion.” Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.1072(c) (2008).
While I have not found a judicial ruling on the constitutionality of Born-Alive Infant
Protection Acts, there is substantial legal authority that Roe is inapplicable once live
birth occurs. The decision most on point is Showery v. State, 690 S.W.2d 689 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1985), which upheld a murder conviction for a doctor who suffocated a fetus
after it was removed alive from its mother’s body following an abortion attempt. The
court held that Roe was irrelevant because “[s]eparation from the mother is a rite of
passage beyond the shadow of conflict with her fundamental rights.” Id. at 693-94.
Nealis v. Baird, 996 P.2d 438 (Okla. 1999) (upholding a wrongful death action for
a non-viable fetus born alive), reached a similar conclusion: “Nothing in Roe
prohibits the states from affording legal protection to fetuses that are born alive.” Id.
at 454-55. Moreover, Judge Richard Posner has stated that “[o]nce the baby emerges
from the mother’s body, no possible concern for the mother’s life or health justifies
killing the baby.” Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 882 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner,
J., dissenting) (involving partial-birth abortion bans), rev’d, 249 F.3d 603 (7th Cir.
2001). See infra text accompanying note 221. Finally, the history of Pennsylvania’s
statutory protection for born-alive infants strongly supports the view that Roe is
inapplicable to such legislation. Both the 1974 and 1982 statutes were part of
comprehensive abortion legislation, each entitled “Abortion Control Act.” See supra
note 81. When both of these Acts were challenged as unconstitutional, the born-alive
infant protection provisions were not attacked individually, but only as part of the
claim that the Acts as a whole were unconstitutional. When the courts in both cases
denied these comprehensive claims, Act opponents did not even argue that the
born-alive protective provisions were individually invalid. See American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Pennsylvania Section v. Thornburgh, 552 F. Supp.
791 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (challenging the 1982 Act), aff’d, 476747 (1986); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (challenging the
1974 Act), aff’d sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976) (plaintiffs’
appeal), aff’d sub nom. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (defendants’
appeal). Thus, even those eager to challenge abortion restrictions acknowledged
Roe’s inapplicability to measures protecting humans born alive. 
 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 87
The “Roe is inapplicable” argument follows naturally from Roe’s
acknowledged inapplicability to babies born alive. In the partial-birth
procedure, the baby is killed before it is completely separated from the
woman, but during a birth process–either the baby’s entire head or its
trunk from above the navel is entirely outside the woman.  At this87
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 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 88
 In the initial phase of the lawsuit, the State argued that Roe did not recognize “‘a89
constitutional right to kill a partially born human being.’” Carhart v. Stenberg, 972
F. Supp. 507, 529 (D. Neb. 1997) (abortionist’s request for preliminary injunction).
The court interpreted this argument as an “invitation to ignore Roe” and declined to
accept it because there was “no precedent...[that] uses the ‘partially born human
being’ category as a construct for constitutional analysis.” Id. The court declined that
invitation for a “second time” in ruling favorably on the abortionist’s request for a
permanent injunction. Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1132 n.48 (D. Neb.
1998). The Eighth Circuit expressed no final opinion on whether “there is a separate
legal category for the ‘partially born.’” Carhart v. Stenberg , 192 F.3d 1142, 1151
(8th Cir. 1999). Even if there were, the category would not be relevant to the present
litigation because the court believed “that the word ‘born’ refers most naturally to a
viable fetus.” Id. This article demonstrates the deficiencies in this argument. See infra
notes 159-72 and accompanying text.
 For Carhart I, see Brief of Amici Curiae Louisiana and Mississippi in Support of90
Petitioners, 2000 WL 228483, at 2-11. For Carhart II, see, e.g., Brief of Amici
Curiae the American Center for Law and Justice, 78 Members of Congress, and the
Committee to Protect the Ban on Partial-Birth Abortion in Support of Petitioner, 2006
WL 1436694, at 9-11. 
stage of partial separation, when the baby clearly is alive, its skull is
collapsed.  As will now be demonstrated, Roe cannot properly be read88
to protect the right to kill a baby in this manner. 
A. By Its Own Terms Roe Does Not Apply 
Once the Birth Process Begins
In view of Carhart I and Carhart II, it would seem the height of
presumption to argue that Roe does not apply to the partial-birth
procedure. The argument was explicitly discussed in the lower court
decisions leading to Carhart I.  The theory was also articulated in89
briefs submitted to the Court in both cases.  Nonetheless, the Court in90
both decisions totally ignored the “Roe is inapplicable” argument and
applied Roe/Casey to evaluate partial-birth abortion bans. While the
Court’s complete disregard of the theory admittedly seems to be its
deathblow, this would be an unduly negative assessment. Carhart II
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 This conclusion follows undeniably from several statements in the opinion. The91
fetus is extracted from the womb by methods “conducive to pulling out its entire
body, instead of ripping it apart.” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, at 137 (2007).
Doctors thus extract “the fetus intact or largely intact.” Id. This extraction method is
a “delivery” in that it “‘assist[s] a woman in childbirth.’” Id. at 152 (quoting
Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 470 (27th ed. 2000)). It thus is properly characterized
as a “birth process.” Id. at 157; see id. at 160. The fetus, regardless of viability, “is
a living organism while within the womb,” id. at 147–an “unborn child,” id. at 160;
see id. at 134, and an “infant life.” Id. at 159. The doctor then kills the fetus after
either its head or “‘trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother.’” Id. at
147-48 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 2004)). Taken together, these
statements acknowledge that the partial-birth procedure kills a baby during its birth.
See id. at 138-39 (the Court relating a nurse’s description of how a doctor stuck
“‘scissors in the back of...[a “‘baby’s’”] head’”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 108-58, at
3 (2003)). For a defense of the Court’s characterization, see supra notes 28-34 and
accompanying text and infra notes 142-186 and accompanying text. 
 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 92
 Id. at 153. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text. 93
 See 410 U.S. at 157-58. 94
 Id. at 159.95
acknowledges that the partial-birth procedure kills a baby during its
birth.  All that remains is for the Court to recognize that Roe did not91
extend constitutional protection to a process that kills a baby after its
birth has begun. 
The Roe Court held that the constitutional right of privacy
encompasses “the abortion decision,”  i.e., “a woman’s decision92
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”  There plainly is no93
constitutional right to abort once birth occurs. First, once the fetus is
born, it enjoys the protection accorded by the Fourteenth Amendment
to the life of every “person.”  Second, while the Court stated that it94
would “not resolve the difficult question of when life begins,” it was
responding to the assertion that “life “begins at conception and is
present throughout pregnancy.”  The Court therefore was only95
expressing its unwillingness to “speculate” as to when life begins
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 See id. But as argued by Judge Michael McConnell, the result in Roe, withdrawing96
legal protection for fetal life, shows that the Court in fact decided the question.
Samuel W. Calhoun & Andrea E. Sexton, “Is It Possible to Take Both Fetal Life and
Women Seriously? Professor Laurence Tribe and His Reviewers,” 49 Washington &
Lee Law Review 437, 453 n.79 (1992). 
 410 U.S. at 150, 161. 97
 Id. at 161-62.98
 See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text (discussing Born-Alive Infant99
Protection Acts).
 410 U.S. at 158, 162. 100
 Bopp & Cook, supra note 2, at 26. Justice Scalia argues that the partial-birth101
procedure involves “killing a human child–one cannot even accurately say an entirely
unborn human child.” Carhart I, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
 See supra note 32 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 206-08 and102
accompanying text.
 410 U.S. at 118 n.1. 103
during a pregnancy.  The Court elsewhere stated its belief that at “live96
birth” both human life  and personhood “in the whole sense”97 98
unquestionably are present.  99
But what exactly does “live birth” mean? In particular, what is the
status of a fetus in the process of being born? Roe is not entirely clear
on this point, but it contains important indicators. First, in speaking of
both constitutional and ontological personhood, the Court stated that
these categories do not include “the unborn.”  As James Bopp and Dr.100
Curtis Cook have argued, “[a] baby who is partially delivered cannot
properly be termed unborn.”  In the partial-birth procedure, either the101
fetus’s head or the lower half of its body is outside the woman,  i.e.,102
born. Second, the Court quotes, but does not comment upon, a Texas
parturition statute, not challenged in the Roe litigation, that
criminalized killing “‘a child in a state of being born and before actual
birth.’”  Professor Richard Stith argues that this bare reference shows103
that the Court “explicitly left undecided” the issue of whether the
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 Richard Stith, “Location and Life: How Stenberg v. Carhart Undercut Roe v.104
Wade,” 9 William & Mary Journal of Women & Law 255, 266-67 (2003). Yet
Professor Stith himself still argues that to disregard the beginning of the birth process
is to act inconsistently with Roe’s premise that “[l]ocation–in or out of the
womb–...determined whether actual human life existed and whether it was
constitutionally protected.” Id. at 255; see id. at 266-67.
 Bopp & Cook, supra note 2, at 26-27. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third105
Circuit gave two reasons for rejecting this argument based on the Texas statute. First,
“[t]he fact that the Supreme Court did not sua sponte review a provision no party
asked it to review says nothing about its position on that provision or on [the
argument that Roe is inapplicable to partial-birth abortions].” Planned Parenthood
of Central N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 144 (3d Cir. 2000). This is a good point, but
the court ignores the important exchange in oral argument concerning the statute. See
infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. Second, the court considered any
arguments based upon the statute as inapplicable to partial-birth abortion because the
statute, “[b]y its own terms...applies explicitly to killing the fetus...during the process
of giving birth, not during an abortion procedure.” Farmer, 220 F.3d at 144. It will
be shown that the partial-birth procedure is an instance of “giving birth.” See infra
notes 142-86 and accompanying text.
 Robert C. Flowers was an Assistant Attorney General of Texas. Roe, 410 U.S. at106
115.
“momentous shift from sub-human to human life [occurs] at the
beginning, in the middle, or at the end of the birth process.”  Since,104
however, the Court denies personhood only to “the unborn,” one can
reasonably read its silence about this Texas statute as suggesting “that
abortion jurisprudence does not govern state regulation of procedures
during extraction of the child.”  This conclusion is further supported105
by an exchange that occurred during the oral arguments in Roe: 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: What does it [the parturition statute] mean? 
MR. FLOWERS:  I would think that – 106
JUSTICE STEWART: That it is an offense to kill a child in the process of
childbirth? 
MR. FLOWERS: Yes, sir. It would be immediately before childbirth, or right
in the proximity of the child being born.
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Which is not an abortion. 
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 Transcript of Oral Re-argument, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1972) (No. 70-18)107
(emphasis added), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_ 70_
18/reargument (last visited Jan. 25, 2010)) My thanks to my former student, Mark
Trapp, for bringing this enlightening colloquy to my attention. See Mark M. Trapp,
“Blackmun’s Bane,” Enter Stage Right, Jan. 27, 2003, available at http://www.
enterstageright.com/archive/articles/0103/0103abortion.htm (last visited Jan. 25,
2010). 
 I am aware of the grounds for criticizing placing undue emphasis on this exchange108
concerning a statute that was not under review in Roe. See infra note 129 and
accompanying text.
 As mentioned, sixty-three professors endorsed the theory in a 1997 letter to109
Congress, submitted in conjunction with congressional debate on the proposed ban.
See supra note 75 and accompanying text. In addition, Roe’s limited scope was
asserted by several different law professors on multiple occasions during
congressional hearings on the ban. See supra notes 53-55, 60 and accompanying text.
MR. FLOWERS: Which is not–would not be an abortion, yes sir. You’re
correct, sir. It would be homicide.107
Based on this dialogue, it is reasonable to conclude that Justice
Marshall, who voted with the majority in Roe, did not intend to
recognize a constitutional right that would bar states from prohibiting
killing a child once delivery has begun.  Justice Stewart, also in the108
Roe majority, did not question Justice Marshall’s characterization. One
can therefore reasonably surmise that he agreed with Justice Marshall’s
understanding that the right to abortion ends when the birth process
begins. 
It is noteworthy that Roe’s inapplicability to the partial-birth
procedure was asserted by numerous law professors during the
legislative process leading to the Federal Ban.  Those law professors109
who believed a ban to be unconstitutional had mixed responses.
Harvard Professor Laurence Tribe, while never commenting directly on
the “Roe is inapplicable” theory, demonstrated that he failed to grasp
its underlying anatomical facts. Tribe asserts that a ban is irrational
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 March 1997 Hearing, supra note 52, at 137 (prepared statement of Prof. Laurence110
H. Tribe).
 Id. (emphasis added). 111
 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. Tribe is not the only one to make this112
mistake. See infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text (emphasizing Judge Richard
Posner’s error). 
 April 1996 Hearing, supra note 53, at 123 (question from Rep. Canady, Member,113
House Committee on the Judiciary). 
 Id.114
 See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. 115
because it “defies plausible justification in terms of anything real.”110
How so? Because the ban draws a distinction based, strangely, on the
physical location of the fetus between the uterus and the vagina...as
though the fetus that is being aborted were suddenly to acquire...traits
of personhood, simply by virtue of having been moved from one point
to another within the woman’s body prior to completion of the abortion
procedure.  Tribe unaccountably overlooks the crucial fact of the111
fetus’s partial emergence into the outside world.112
In 1996, Georgetown Professor Mark Tushnet was asked directly
whether the partial-birth procedure, “in which a child is partially
delivered before being killed and the delivery is completed[,] is within
the scope of the protections afforded by Roe v. Wade[.]”  Tushnet113
testified that his “intuition” led him to conclude that Roe applied
because the Court “drew the line at birth,” and it would be difficult to
draw it any earlier.  This is a particularly interesting response given114
that Tushnet was Justice Marshall’s law clerk when Roe was reargued
and decided. As already shown, the Justice himself had no difficulty in
drawing a line earlier than birth–to him, the word “abortion” did not
encompass killing a child during the process of childbirth.115
Professor Louis Seidman, another Marshall clerk at the time of
Roe, would seemingly agree with the distinction drawn by Justice
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 November 1995 Hearing, supra note 54, at 170, 174, 194, 198. 116
 See id. at 199-200.117
 Id. at 200. 118
 Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1998)119
(citation omitted).
 Professor Laurence Tribe presumably would agree: “Nearly everyone, surely,120
would think it profoundly wrong if ‘people with power’ chose to treat an admittedly
‘unborn’ infant, struggling to push itself through the birth canal during the final
Marshall. Seidman, although arguing in 1995 for a ban’s
unconstitutionality, came close to admitting the validity of the “Roe is
inapplicable” theory. Professor Seidman’s testimony was preceded by
that of Professor Douglas Kmiec, who defended the theory.  After116
Senator Fred Thompson repeatedly pressed for Professor Seidman’s
response to the distinction Kmiec drew between abortions–covered by
Roe/Casey–and the partial-birth scenario that he asserted fell outside
those decisions,  Seidman said, “I suppose if Congress wants to pass117
a law that prohibits stabbing a scissors into the head of a baby where
everything is out of the birth canal but a portion of the head, that would
be something we could consider.”  Judge Richard Posner would allow118
even more extensive protection for the baby. In explaining his
constitutional objection to Wisconsin’s partial-birth abortion ban,
Posner stated: 
We...do not doubt that if in the course of a normal labor the mother asked her
obstetrician to kill the baby in the birth canal and he did so, the state could
criminalize this act as infanticide. But here...the state has criminalized merely a
procedure, and acknowledged the right to abort by an alternative procedure the same
fetus whose death by partial birth abortion would subject the doctor to punishment as
a murderer. So there is no issue of infanticide, of killing a live baby that is
half-born.  119
Posner thus flatly proclaims that a state can criminalize killing a baby
still wholly within the birth canal,  i.e., none of it is outside the120
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minutes of its mother’s labor, as not yet a person morally entitled to our protection
and love.” Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes (1990), p. 120.
 Posner speaks of a killing within the birth canal, whereas Seidman refers to killing121
a baby mostly outside the mother. See supra text accompanying note 118. It will be
shown that Posner’s grasp of the anatomy of the partial-birth procedure is erroneous.
See infra notes 206-09 and accompanying text. 
 See supra text accompanying note 119. 122
 See infra note 134 and accompanying text. 123
 See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.124
mother.  His necessary presupposition is that Roe does not extend121
constitutional protection to such an act. 
My principal thesis thus far has been threefold: (1) that the
abortion right recognized in Roe is delimited by the onset of birth; (2)
that the partial-birth procedure entails the beginning of birth; and (3)
thus that Roe does not constrain legislative bans. It might be argued,
however, that my syllogism has a glaring weakness– “birth” as used in
Roe most probably connoted a full-term delivery. Thus, when Justice
Marshall indicated that killing a child during childbirth “is not an
abortion,” he likely had in mind a full-term fetus emerging from the
womb in a routine delivery. Judge Posner obviously had such a fetus
in mind when he referred to a state’s ability to criminalize killing a
“baby in the birth canal” during “a normal labor.”  Consequently,122
even if one accepts the proposition that Roe has a limited scope, the
limitation is not nearly broad enough to encompass the typical
partial-birth abortion, which occurs far earlier than full-term.123
The foregoing argument can be readily overcome by focusing once
more on Justice Marshall’s suggestion, via his comment on the Texas
parturition statute, that Roe does not apply to killing a child during
childbirth.  The Texas statute criminalized killing “‘a child in a state124
of being born and before actual birth, which child would otherwise
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 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 118 n.1 (1973). 125
 Marshall made his observation on October 11, 1972. See supra note 107.126
 Hardin v. State, 106 S.W. 352, 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 1907). 127
 This understanding of “born alive” is extrapolated from Texas homicide law. A128
successful homicide prosecution required proof that the victim was living after
complete expulsion from the mother’s body. See Wallace v. State, 10 Tex. Ct. App.
255, 270 (1881). Showing “aliveness” in turn required a showing that the baby
breathed following its complete separation. See id. at 271-74. If this test was met, the
child was deemed to be “born alive.” Thereafter, “‘however frail it may be, and
however near extinction from any cause,’” a person who intentionally killed it would
be guilty of homicide. See id. at 275-76. The parturition statute, which covers killings
“before actual birth,” obviously eliminates any separation requirement. Instead, the
question is whether the child, had it not been killed during its birth, would have been
able to breathe following its complete separation. The homicide standard of
“‘however frail’” shows that in 1972 the parturition statute did not require proof that
the baby would have been viable, see infra note 131, had it not been killed prior to
complete separation, despite what at least one court has stated. R.I. Medical Society
v. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp. 2d 288, 304 (D.R.I. 1999), aff’d, 239 F.3d 104 (1st Cir.
2001). This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Texas, a few years after the oral
argument in Roe, enacted a definition of “born alive” that plainly excludes a viability
requirement: a child is deemed to be born alive, “irrespective of the duration of
pregnancy,” as long as it breathes or shows other stipulated “evidence of life” after
its “complete expulsion or extraction” from its mother.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §12.
05(b) (Vernon 1979) (now codified at Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 151.002(b) (Vernon
2001)). 
have been born alive.’”  The critical phrase is “would otherwise have125
been born alive.” Does it connote a full-term delivery? The clear
answer is “no.” At the time of Justice Marshall’s comment,  the only126
proof Texas required was that, “but for the act of the accused,”  the127
child would have been able to breathe following complete separation
from its mother.  The common occurrence of premature births plainly128
shows that breathing ability precedes full-term development.
Consequently, Justice Marshall, in indicating that the act prohibited by
the Texas parturition statute was not an “abortion,” did not contemplate
a “full-term baby” constraint on Roe’s inapplicability to the birth
process.
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 See supra note 105. 129
 690 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). 130
 Id. at 692. A fetus is viable when it is “potentially able to live outside the mother’s131
womb, albeit with artificial aid.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973). 
 The court’s statement is far from definitive: Roe “might” be pertinent. Moreover,132
the Showery court’s statement was dictum, as the case did not involve a prosecution
under the parturition statute.
 Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507, 529 (D. Neb. 1997). See, e.g., R.I. Medical133
Society v. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp. 2d 288, 304 (D.R.I. 1999), aff'd, 239 F.3d 104
(1st Cir. 2001); Planned Parenthood of Central N.J. v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d 478,
497 (D.N.J. 1998), aff'd sub nom. Planned Parenthood of Central N.J. v. Farmer,
220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000). 
But isn’t it unconvincing to rely so heavily on the specifics of the
Texas parturition statute in evaluating Marshall’s statement? The
statute was not at issue in Roe,  and one therefore cannot fairly129
assume that Marshall’s brief comment was made in full awareness of
its particulars. In addition, there is an indication that the Texas courts
themselves believe that Roe impacted the constitutionality of the Texas
statute. In Showery v. Texas,  the court stated that “[a] prosecution130
under [the] statute might necessitate an analysis in terms of viability
under Roe.”  This statement does not support the “full-term baby”131
constraint on Roe’s inapplicability to the birth process, but it does
suggest that there might be a viability constraint.  In fact, Roe’s132
emphasis on viability is a principal reason that many courts have
rejected the “Roe is inapplicable” approach. A representative assertion
is that “Roe...categorized fetuses as viable or not viable. No case with
which we are familiar uses the ‘partially born human being’ category
as a construct for constitutional analysis.”133
If there is a viability limitation on Roe’s inapplicability to the birth
process, the argument that Roe does not apply to partial-birth abortion
bans is largely defeated, for the partial-birth procedure is mainly used
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 See Woodward, supra note 3, at 439 (discussing an investigative report by David134
Brown of The Washington Post). 
 See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.135
 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63. However, Roe prevents the states from according136
meaningful protection even to viable fetuses. See infra notes 219, 227 and
accompanying text. 
 At one point, the Roe Court refers to viability as an “interim point” preceding “live137
birth.” 410 U.S. at 160. This does not mean that “live birth” can only occur after
viability. The Court no doubt was referring to a pregnancy of normal length, in which
viability does precede birth. To say that live birth can never precede viability would
be to contradict medical reality. See infra notes 159-72 and accompanying text.
 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. 138
 See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text. 139
for pre-viable fetuses.  Roe itself, however, refutes a viability134
constraint. As already noted, the Court denied personhood only to the
“unborn,” a word that can reasonably be read to exclude any partially
delivered baby, regardless of stage of development.  Moreover, to135
impose a viability constraint is to misperceive the role of viability in
Roe’s analytical framework. Viability marks the point during a
pregnancy at which the state interest in potential life becomes
compelling, therefore justifying prohibition of abortion.  But the136
beginning of the birth process means that the pregnancy is essentially
over.  The “potential life” is now manifest as the baby emerges alive137
from the woman’s body. To acknowledge this reality in no way
conflicts with the Court’s unwillingness to speculate about when life
begins in an ongoing pregnancy.  Viability is thus not a prerequisite138
for the power to legislate constitutionally about the birth process.
There is a final argument that Roe did not intend to encompass
non-viable, partially born children within the abortion right. As noted,
Judge Posner assumes that a state can constitutionally prohibit as
infanticide the killing of a baby during “normal labor.”  But he argues139
that partial-birth abortion bans are unconstitutional because they do not
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 See supra text accompanying note 119. 140
 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 141
 Alisa Solomon, “Fetal Distraction: In the Fight over Abortion, Women’s Rights142
Seem to Have Disappeared,” The Village Voice, Jan. 27, 1998, at 49. 
 See 60 Minutes: Partial-Birth Abortion, supra note 53 (comment of Dr. Warren143
Hern).
 “In Depth: Late-Term Abortions” (America’s Talking television broadcast June 22,144
1995) (comment of Vicki Saporta, Executive Director, National Abortion Federation)
(on file with author). 
 Gorney, supra note 33, at 33. 145
constitute “killing a live baby that is half-born.”  Posner’s140
characterization of the partial-birth procedure can be evaluated
mpirically. If the procedure does in fact kill “a live baby that is
half-born”–a test that does not mention viability–Posner’s logic
compels the conclusion that partial-birth abortion bans, just like the
infanticide laws he endorses, are not subject to Roe. The Supreme
Court in Carhart II acknowledges that the partial-birth procedure does
kill a baby during its birth.  The next section will demonstrate that the141
Court is correct. Roe therefore does not constrain partial-birth abortion
bans. 
B. Partial-Birth Abortion Kills a Baby During Its Birth
Does the reference to “birth” in “partial-birth abortion” ring true? Ban
opponents have strenuously said “no,” branding the term as
disingenuous,  propagandistic,  and “inflammatory.”  Professor142 143 144
Cynthia Gorney has written that “[t]here is no textbook reference to
any...medical state called ‘partial birth.’”  Even if one assumes she is145
correct–which is doubtful today given the prominence of the
partial-birth abortion controversy–this would not mean there is no
actual physical state of being partially born. To my knowledge, there
is no word that means “a person in the process of going through a door
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 Carhart I, 530 U.S. 914, 986 n.5 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas’s “all146
but born” characterization is clearly correct, given that either the fetus’s head or over
half its lower body is outside the woman’s body before it is killed. See supra note 32
and accompanying text. 
 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 147
 November 1995 Hearing, supra note 54, at 150 (statement of Helen Alvare). And148
“partly” means far more than minimally. See supra note 146.
 “‘Partial-birth’ as a label emphasizes the fact the delivery of a fetus/baby takes149
place, but only up to a point....” Woodward, supra note 3, at 433. 
 See supra text accompanying note 119.150
 See supra text accompanying note 119.151
 See Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124, 135-37 (2007). 152
from the inside of a house to the outdoors.” This does not mean there
are no people who are partially outdoors as they emerge from
doorways. 
The simplest way to resolve this dispute over use of the term,
“birth” is to ask if the phrase “partial birth” describes what actually
happens in the partial-birth abortion procedure. It does. As pointed out
by Justice Clarence Thomas, “the fetus is all but born when the
physician causes its death.”  The fetus dies while being born, i.e.,146
being removed from the woman’s body.  Its life is terminated when147
it “has already emerged partly into what we would call in layperson's
terms the outside world.”  Hence, it was partially born at the time of148
its death.149
As noted, Judge Richard Posner asserts that the partial-birth
procedure does not involve “killing a live baby that is half-born.”  His150
explanation, however, is curious at best–that a state cannot
constitutionally prohibit killing the same fetus “by an alternative
procedure.”  Posner here is referring to the fact that partial-birth151
abortion bans do not apply to standard D&E abortions, in which a fetus
is dismembered and removed from the uterus in pieces,  rather than152
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 Despite the weakness of Posner’s argument, one court characterizes it as153
adequately addressing the concern that striking a partial-birth abortion ban “will
condone infanticide.” See Planned Parenthood of Central N.J. v. Verniero, 41 F.
Supp. 2d 478, 498 (D.N.J. 1998), aff’d sub nom. Planned Parenthood of Central N.J.
v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000). For an extended discussion of the rationality
of banning the partial-birth procedure, despite the inability to prohibit standard
D&Es, see infra notes 193-233 and accompanying text.
 For the argument that the Federal Born-Alive Infants Protection Act precludes the154
concept of “partial birth,” see infra note 163. 
 In fact, some have criticized the term “partial-birth” for the very reason that “birth”155
most naturally connotes a full-term baby. See Bopp & Cook, supra note 2, at 22.
Some ban opponents have further alleged that ban advocates deliberately cultivated
the misimpression that the partial-birth procedure normally involves near-term
fetuses, see March 1997 Hearing, supra note 52, at 86-90 (statements of Kate
Michelman), a charge denied by ban proponents. See id. at 87-88 (statements of
Helen Alvare and Douglas Johnson). There undeniably were some instances when ban
advocates gave incorrect information. See Vobejda & Brown, supra note 47 (relating
Newt Gingrich’s assertion that the procedure is used to abort “‘child[ren] in the eighth
or ninth month’”). In fact, the procedure is mainly used for fetuses of “less than 24
weeks gestation.” Id. It should be noted, however, that Dr. Martin Haskell stated that
he knew of a surgeon who used it “up to 32 weeks or more.” Haskell Presentation,
supra note 30. 
 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 156
being extracted intact, as in the partial-birth procedure. But does
Posner’s point matter at all in evaluating what actually occurs during
the partial-birth procedure? The fetus either is or is not alive and
half-born when killed. The fact that it could be killed in some other
way is irrelevant.  153
But there are other possible objections to characterizing the
partial-birth procedure as involving an actual partial birth.154
Admittedly, the initial picture the word “birth” suggests is a full-term,
natural birth.  That said, few, presumably, would conclude that155
“partial-birth” is an inapt description because the procedure takes place
far earlier than at full-term  and depends upon artificial means.156
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 James Bopp and Curtis Cook are thus correct in saying that “full-term” and157
“birth...are two completely different things, both legally and in common parlance.”
Bopp & Cook, supra note 2, at 22. While premature births are not uncommon, “birth”
has also been used to describe some quite unusual deliveries prior to full-term. The
CBS Evening News of June 6, 2008 contained an intriguing segment entitled “Born
Twice.” It was the story of Macee McCartney, who had prenatal surgery at
twenty-five weeks. To perform the procedure, the doctors temporarily pulled the
uterus from her mother’s body and then pulled half of Macee’s body outside the
uterus. The CBS correspondent spoke of Macee’s “two birth dates,” i.e., the day of
her surgery–“the first time she was born”–and her delivery-day ten weeks later.
Evening News (CBS television broadcast June 6, 2008) (transcript on file with the
author). Katie Couric referred to the “baby born not once, but twice.” Id. 
 Macee’s example, supra note 157, also shows that “birth” includes non-standard158
removal from the mother. It is interesting that CBS used “birth,” not partial birth, to
describe Macee’s half-delivered state. 
 Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1151 (8th Cir. 1999), aff'd, 530 U.S. 914159
(2000).
Deliveries prior to full-term are habitually called premature births,157
and deliveries that are induced, assisted by forceps, or occur via
Caesarian section all constitute births.  But there are two more serious158
arguments: the partial-birth procedure is not a partial “birth” because
(1) it involves a fetus who likely is pre-viable; and (2) it aims for a
dead, not a live, baby. Neither of these characteristics negates a partial
“birth.” 
1. Viability Is Not a Prerequisite for Partial Birth
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in addressing the
“Roe is inapplicable” argument, believed there was no need to
determine whether there is a “legal category” for the “‘partially born,’”
to which “the rule of Roe...does not apply.”  This step was159
unnecessary because the record was insufficient to prove that fetuses
subject to the partial-birth procedure were partially born”–the word
‘born’ refers most naturally to a viable fetus, one that is capable of
surviving outside the mother,” whereas the case seemed “to be
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 Id. See R.I. Medical Society v. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp. 2d 288, 304 (D.R.I. 1999)160
(suggesting that non-viability in itself precludes a birth process), aff’d, 239 F.3d 104
(1st Cir. 2001). This article’s earlier discussion of viability evaluated and rejected the
argument that Roe’s implied inapplicability to the birth process encompassed only
viable fetuses. See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text. The present discussion
of viability evaluates the empirical question of whether the concept of “partial birth”
includes only viable fetuses.
 See supra text accompanying note 155. 161
 Gorney, supra note 33, at 44. In this hypothetical, the baby’s gestational age when162
born suggests its possible viability. It is unclear whether Johnson would state the same
outcome if the baby were clearly non-viable. Regardless, other legal developments
demonstrate that lack of viability should be irrelevant to a fully separated baby’s
entitlement to legal protection. See infra notes 163-68 and accompanying text. 
exclusively about non-viable fetuses.”160
Assuming that “born” does “most naturally” refer to a viable
fetus,  does non-viability mean there can be no partial birth? In161
answering this question, it is instructive first to consider viability’s
pertinence to full-birth status. The National Right to Life Committee’s
Douglas Johnson gives this view:
The fetus’s location is what matters...if it’s all the way out of the woman’s body and
it’s alive, it’s been born, no matter how developed it is.... “Let’s say you have a baby
born at twenty-two and three-quarters weeks,” ...[and] “[y]ou have two
neo-natologists standing over the incubator, arguing about whether they should do
this or that, whether it’s futile, whether this baby has a chance. Suddenly somebody
rushes in from the corridor and strikes the baby on the head with a hammer. Does
anybody dispute that a homicide just occurred? No. One neo-natologist may say a
certain intervention is futile here. Another may say, ‘No, we should do this or that
thing.’ But they’re both going to grab that guy and call the cops.”
162
Johnson’s argument rings true. Viability is clearly irrelevant to birth
status for fetuses killed after complete separation from the woman.
This is now a legal reality under federal law, even if the separation
occurred during an abortion procedure. Under the Federal Born-Alive
Infants Protection Act, fully separated infants can fit the definition of
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 See supra note 85. One court has used this complete separation requirement to163
suggest that partially separated infants cannot be “born alive.” See National Abortion
Federation v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, 288 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated, 224 F. App.x 88
(2d Cir. 2007). The court’s argument reflects a complete misreading of the statute.
The Federal Act includes only fully separated infants within its statutory definition
of “born alive,” but also says that it shall not “be construed to...deny...or contract any
legal status or legal right applicable to any member of the species homo sapiens at any
point prior to being ‘born alive.’” 1 U.S.C. § 8(c) (2006). The law thus “affirms the
existence and dignity of postnatal life without denying the same of prenatal life.”
Stith, supra note 104, at 275. See National Abortion Federation v. Gonzales, 437
F.3d 278, 312 (2d Cir. 2006) (Straub, J., dissenting), vacated, 224 F. App.x. 88 (2d
Cir. 2007). 
 See supra note 85. Viability is also irrelevant under most State Born-Alive Infant164
Protection Acts. See, e.g., 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 70/1.36 (Supp. 2008); Mich. Comp. Laws
§333.1071(2)(b) (2008). Some states require viability, e.g., Mont. Code Ann.
§50-20-108(1) (2007) (the statute is not named a “Born-Alive Infant Protection Act,”
but instead is entitled “Protection of premature infants born alive”), but this is a
minority view. See H.R. Rep. No. 107-186, at 7, 13 (2001) (stating that thirty States
follow a definition of “live birth” that does not contain a viability prerequisite and
applies in a failed abortion context). 
 E.g., Fla. Stat. §§ 382.002(10), 382.013 (2007); 410 Ill. Comp. Stat. 535/1(5),165
535/12(1) (2005). The authors of a 2005 British study, which examined the incidence
of completely expelled or extracted living fetuses following abortion attempts,
presumably would question this practice. The study documents eighteen examples of
pre-viable fetuses that met the criteria of “live birth” according to the World Health
Organization definition. Vadeyar et. al., supra note 83, at 1159-60. The authors said,
“it is clear that there is significant underreporting.” Id. at 1161. The law required that
“all live births and neonatal deaths must be registered.” Id. at 1159-60. Nonetheless,
the authors questioned “what purpose it serves to register as a live birth a fetus that
is clearly not capable of being born alive and surviving...because the gestational age
is below the clinical limit of viability. This...misleadingly increases the perinatal
mortality rate.” Id. at 1161. It is difficult to imagine a more striking example of an
effort to mask the reality of live birth. 
“born alive,”  regardless of their stage of development.  Viability163 164
has also been found to be irrelevant in other contexts. Some states issue
birth certificates for babies born alive regardless of viability.  Most165
states allow actions for non-fatal prenatal injuries regardless of when
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 Paul Benjamin Linton, “Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Flight from Reason166
in the Supreme Court,” 13 St. Louis University Public Law Review 15, 47-49 (1993).
 Nealis v. Baird, 996 P.2d 438, 455 (Okla. 1999): “Reason dictates that a child,167
once born alive, must be recognized as a person regardless of its ability to sustain life
for any particular period of time thereafter.” Hudak v. Georgy, 634 A.2d 600, 603
(Pa. 1993): “[T]oday we are reaffirming the unremarkable proposition that an infant
born alive is, without qualification, a person.” The Hudak court states that “no
jurisdiction...[requires] that a child must be viable at the time of [live] birth in order
to maintain an action in wrongful death.” Id. at 602.
 See Showery v. State, 690 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. App. 1985) (upholding the murder168
conviction of a doctor who suffocated a fetus after it was removed alive from its
mother’s body following an abortion attempt). But cf. People v. Chavez, 176 P.2d 92,
94-95 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947) (stating that a showing of viability is required, but,
in finding the evidence sufficient to prove that the “child was born alive and became
a human being,” only mentions “that the baby was born alive and that it breathed and
had heart action”). In the non-abortion context, there is also increasing legal
recognition of the irrelevance of viability. The Federal Unborn Victims of Violence
Act (Laci and Conner’s Law) “provides that if a child in utero is injured or killed
during the commission of certain federal crimes of violence against its mother, then
the assailant has committed an offense against two victims: the mother and the unborn
child.” Luke M. Milligan, “A Theory of Stability: John Rawls, Fetal Homicide, and
Substantive Due Process,” 87 Brigham Young University Law Review 1177, 1183
(2007) (describing 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (Supp. V 2005)). The Act applies regardless of
the unborn child’s stage of development. Id. at 1183 n.19. Thirty-six states have also
“incorporated the double-victim approach into their penal codes[,]” id. at 1184, and
twenty-four of these “provide that unborn children become legally separate entities
upon their conception.” Id. at 1185 & n.25. 
during pregnancy they were inflicted.  Viability is also not a166
requirement for wrongful death actions brought in connection with
babies who died after being born alive.  Criminal convictions have167
also been upheld for causing the death of a live-born baby, regardless
of viability.168
Stage of development should also be irrelevant to partial-birth
status for partially delivered fetuses. Non-viability does not mean that
a partially extracted fetus has not been partially born. The key inquiry
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 Because the Federal Ban applies even to non-viable fetuses, one court severely169
criticized Congress for its “misleading and inaccurate language” suggesting that the
partial-birth procedure kills a baby during its birth. Planned Parenthood Federation
of America v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1029-30 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d sub
nom. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163
(9th Cir. 2006), rev’d, Gonzales v. Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). To the court, “a
‘live’ fetus is not the same as a ‘viable’ fetus.” Id. at 1030. No one can dispute this
point. But it is also indisputable that a non-viable fetus can still be alive. “While a
fetus typically is not viable until at least 24 weeks lmp [last menstrual period], it can
be ‘living’...as early as seven weeks lmp, well before the end of even the first
trimester.” Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d
1163, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d, Gonzales v. Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
Why then is it inaccurate to refer to a living, non-viable fetus, largely outside the
woman’s body, as partially born? 
 Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 147. In upholding South Dakota’s informed170
consent-to-abortion statute, the Eighth Circuit endorsed the “truthfulness” of a
required disclosure describing the fetus as “‘a whole, separate, unique, living human
being,’” with “‘human being’” defined as “‘an individual living member of the species
of Homo sapiens.’” Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724,
735-36 (8th Cir. 2008). As stated by Professor Randy Beck, “[n]o one can reasonably
doubt that a developing fetus constitutes a living biological organism distinct from its
mother long before the point of viability.” Beck, supra note 11, at 274. 
 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.171
 See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 172
is not viability, but whether the fetus is alive.  The Supreme Court in169
Carhart II stated that viability is irrelevant to whether a fetus is alive
within the womb: “[B]y common understanding and scientific
terminology, a fetus is a living organism while within the womb,
whether or not it is viable outside the womb.”  Viability is also170
irrelevant to whether fetuses are alive when doctors begin to drag them
from the womb during the partial-birth process. As previously shown,
the evidence plainly establishes that these fetuses are living up until the
time their skulls are collapsed.  Since they are “all but” outside the171
woman when this occurs,  they are in fact partially born. To say172
otherwise is to deny physical reality. 
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 Planned Parenthood of Central N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 143 (3d Cir. 2000).173
 See id.174
 43 F. Supp. 2d 604 (E.D. La. 1999), aff’d, 221 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2000). 175
 Id. at 612.176
 Id. at 618.177
 Id.178
 See id.179
 Hadley Arkes, Natural Rights and the Right to Choose (2002), p. 276. Professor180
2. Intent to Kill Does Not Negate Partial Birth
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in rejecting the
argument that Roe is inapplicable to partial-birth abortion bans because
a fetus “is in the process of being ‘born’ at the time of its demise,”
stated that “[a] woman seeking an abortion is plainly not seeking to
give birth.”  The court saw no need to conduct an independent173
evaluation as to whether the partial-birth procedure initiates a birth
process. In fact, even to suggest that a partial birth occurs was to
engage in “semantic machinations, irrational line-drawing, and an
obvious attempt to inflame public opinion.”  The woman’s intent to174
kill indelibly marked the procedure as an abortion. 
In refusing to view the partial-birth procedure as an actual partial
birth, the Court in Causeway Medical Suite v. Foster  also stressed175
the woman’s intent–“to terminate her pregnancy” –but in addition176
relied upon the physician’s objective in initiating the alleged “‘process
of birth.’”  “‘[B]irth’” is induced “artificially” in order to complete a177
“particular abortion procedure.”  This marks the procedure as an178
abortion, not “the killing of a child during delivery.”179
To say that intent to kill precludes characterizing the partial-birth
procedure as killing a partially born child is to saythat “[t]here [are] no
objective facts” about birth and the entity being killed.  Once the180
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Arkes does not refer explicitly to the doctor’s intent to kill. He focuses on Judge
Barry's opinion in the Farmer decision, which spoke only of the woman’s intent. See
supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text. Arkes thinks that “[i]f there was ever a
decision that embodied the very vices it was decrying, this must surely have been it.”
Arkes, supra. Why? Because Judge Barry eschews “objective facts” in favor of
“perceptions, ... ‘semantics’ and ‘line-drawing’.” Id. 
 Arkes, supra note 180, at 276. 181
 See, e.g., supra notes 81, 85, 164. 182
 The Federal Born-Alive Infants Protection Act was in part motivated by the183
“logical implications” of the Farmer decision [supra notes 173-74 and accompanying
text], i.e., once a child is marked for abortion, it is wholly irrelevant whether that
child emerges from the womb as a live baby. That child may still be treated as though
he or she did not exist, and would not have any rights under the law.... [T]here would,
then, be no basis upon which the government may prohibit an abortionist from
completely delivering an infant before killing it or allowing it to die. The ‘right to
abortion,’ under this logic, means nothing less than the right to a dead baby, no matter
where the killing takes place. H.R. Rep. No. 107-186, at 2 (2001). Some might
criticize this perspective on Farmer as an alarmist interpretation of what the opinion
actually said. Admittedly, there is nothing in Judge Barry’s discussion of the
significance of intention explicitly indicating that she would give the mother’s
intention to kill dispositive weight in assessing the legal status of a fully separated
child. Still, this possible expansion of intention’s impact has troubled others besides
the House Committee. See National Abortion Federation v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278,
“fateful choice” to abort is made, “there [is] no child to be killed, no
birth to take place.”  But intent to kill does not alter what has actually181
occurred in the real world–the partial emergence of a living baby from
the woman’s body. This physical reality should override anyone’s
intent. 
Lawmakers have already embraced this principle in the different
context of Born-Alive Infant Protection Acts. These laws, previously
discussed, recognize that birth has in fact occurred when a fetus is
completely separated from the woman, even when the separation
results from induced abortion.  The Acts thus subordinate the woman182
and doctor’s common intent to kill to undeniable physical reality–the
existence of a born, living baby.183
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311 n.14 (2d Cir. 2006) (Straub, J., dissenting) (“If the intent of the mother controls
the scope of her right to destroy her offspring, there is no reason why she should not
be able to destroy the child after it has completely been separated from her body.”),
vacated, 224 F. App.x 88 (2d Cir. 2007); Arkes, supra note 180, at 276. At least one
abortionist has clearly indicated that he feels obligated to kill a fully separated living
fetus “because ‘my ultimate job on any given patient is to terminate that pregnancy,
which means that I don’t want a live birth.’” Richmond Medical Center for Women
v. Herring, 527 F.3d 128, 152 (4th Cir. 2008) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). Born-Alive
Infant Protection Acts eliminate any uncertainty by according legal protection to
living, fully separated babies, regardless of anyone’s original intention to kill. 
 See supra text accompanying note 119. 184
 See supra text accompanying note 119. 185
 See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text. 186
 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 187
 As previously stated, moral repulsiveness alone does not mean lack of188
constitutional protection. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. But a
morally repellant practice should receive only the protection that is clearly mandated.
Partial-birth abortion is not encompassed by the abortion right recognized in
Roe/Casey. 
Intention to kill also does not change the physical reality of a
partially born baby. As noted, Judge Posner believes that a state could
criminally punish a doctor who, at the request of the mother, kills a
baby in the birth canal.  The intent of the mother and the doctor to kill184
is no obstacle. Posner denies the partially born state of a baby killed
during the partial-birth procedure,  but his rationale has been shown185
to be unpersuasive.  No one’s intention to destroy should be allowed186
to mask the actual existence of these partially born babies. 
This part has shown that partial-birth abortion is not entitled to the
Roe/Casey level of constitutional protection. Given that the procedure
brutally kills a baby during its birth,  diminishing partial-birth187
abortion’s constitutional status in itself would be a worthwhile
accomplishment,  even if no practical consequences followed. But188
Part III will demonstrate that “demoting” partial-birth abortion in fact
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 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 189
 Id. at 488. See also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 n.7 (1963), quoting190
Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1932): “When the subject lies within the
police power of the state, debatable questions as to reasonableness are not for the
courts but for the Legislature, which is entitled to form its own judgment....” 
 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 191
 Id. at 728. This was the proper test because the Court had first determined that192
could have a significant impact. 
III. CONSEQUENCES OF DIMINISHING 
PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION’S CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS
If partial-birth abortion does not qualify for protection under
Roe/Casey, are there any constraints on majority will with respect to
the procedure? This part demonstrates that any legislation is still
subject to “rational basis” review and that partial-birth abortion bans
readily satisfy this standard. The part then comments on some of the
implications of using the correct evaluative standard in both the federal
and state contexts.
A. Evaluating Partial-Birth Abortion Bans 
Under the Rational Basis Standard
The normal standard for evaluating legislative enactments is the
rational basis test. Williamson v. Lee Optical,  a Supreme Court189
decision in the business realm, contains a classic explanation of this
standard: “It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and
that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a
rational way to correct it.”  But the test applies beyond a commercial190
setting. In Washington v. Glucksberg,  which upheld Washington’s191
assisted-suicide ban, the Court stated that to survive constitutional
scrutiny a law must only be “rationally related to legitimate
governmental interests.”  192
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assisted suicide is not a fundamental right. Id. Part II of this article has established
that the same is true of partial-birth abortion. 
 Carhart I, 530 U.S. 915, 1006 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 193
 Id. In prohibiting an act “that approaches infanticide,” Congress intervened to194
curtail any movement down a slippery slope toward actual infanticide. See Carhart
II, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007). The Court in Glucksberg, in concluding that
Washington’s assisted suicide ban was “rationally related to legitimate government
interests,” 521 U.S. at 728, relied in part on the state’s “fear that permitting assisted
suicide [would] start it down the path to voluntary and perhaps even involuntary
euthanasia.” Id. at 732. In addition, Congress could reasonably “think that
partial-birth abortion...‘undermines the public’s perception of the appropriate role of
a physician during the delivery process, and perverts a process during which life is
brought into the world.’” Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 160. Thus, a ban is rationally related
to the legitimate governmental interest of “‘protecting the integrity and ethics of the
medical profession.’” Id. at 157 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731). 
 Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 1007 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Court in Carhart II also195
relied on this description of the partial-birth procedure. 550 U.S. at 139. 
Do partial-birth abortion bans satisfy the rational basis standard?
Are they reasonably related to furthering legitimate governmental
interests? Justice Clarence Thomas has written that there is a clear
governmental interest in “prohibiting a procedure that approaches
infanticide, and thereby dehumanizes the fetus and trivializes human
life.”  This quote reveals a legitimate governmental interest–193
promoting the value of human life–and a step rationally related to its
promotion–banning an act “that approaches infanticide.”  But does194
this phrase accurately describe the partial-birth procedure? Here is what
one nurse observed: 
The baby’s little fingers were clasping and unclasping, and his little feet were kicking.
Then the doctor stuck the scissors in the back of his head, and the baby’s arms jerked
out, like a startle reaction, like a flinch, like a baby does when he thinks he is going
to fall. The doctor opened up the scissors, stuck a high-powered suction tube into the
opening, and sucked the baby’s brains out. Now the baby went completely limp.
195
While these facts seem to speak for themselves as to the accuracy of
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 “The question whether...[there is] a legitimate interest in banning the procedure196
does not require additional authority.... In a civilized society, the answer is too
obvious, and the contrary arguments too offensive, to merit further discussion.”
Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 1007-08 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 Gorney, supra note 33, at 33. 197
 See Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 181-82, 191 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Carhart I, 530198
U.S. at 946-47 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 951-52 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Their perspective has led to the further allegation that Congress’s only purpose in
enacting the Ban was to “chip away” at Roe. See Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 191
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also Caroline Burnett, “Comment, The
Unconstitutional Purpose Behind the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003,” 42
U.S.F. Law Review 227 (2007). Similarly, it is asserted that state legislators have
supported state bans only to “chip away at the private choice shielded by Roe.”
Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 952 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Judge Posner is credited for
originating this “chipping away” characterization of legislative motives. Id. It will be
shown that this view is untenable. 
 See Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 191 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Carhart I, 530 U.S. at199
946 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 951-52 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 249 F.3d 603 (7th Cir.200
2001) (reversed due to Carhart I). 
Justice Thomas’s description–and to bans’ resulting rationality –some196
have argued that partial-birth abortion bans are irrational because they
do not prohibit the more common D&E method of killing a second
trimester fetus–pulling it “from a woman’s body in dismembered
pieces.”  Justices Stevens and Ginsberg have especially advanced this197
argument  and, in doing so, have heavily relied upon an opinion of198
Judge Posner.  Posner’s reasoning therefore warrants a closer look.199
Posner’s opinion was a dissent to a Seventh Circuit decision
upholding partial-birth abortion bans in Illinois and Wisconsin.  He200
used an example of the abortion of a hydrocephalic baby to
demonstrate the bans’ irrationality: 
If the physician performing the abortion crushes the fetus’s skull in the uterus, killing
the fetus while the fetus is still entirely within the uterus, he is not guilty of violating
either of the statutes.... But if before crushing the fetus’s skull the physician turns the
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 Id. at 879 (Posner, J., dissenting). 201
 Id.202
 Id.203
 Posner says there is “[n]o reason of policy or morality that would allow the one204
[but] would forbid the other.” Id. See Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Doyle,
162 F.3d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 1998) (another Posner opinion in which he wonders “how
a rational legislature could sense a moral difference between” the two different
abortion methods). 
 Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 879 (Posner, J., dissenting). 205
 Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1998). 206
 The cervix is the lower “neck of the uterus” through which a fetus moves into the207
vagina. See Taber’s Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 382 (20th ed. 2001), p. 832. 
 One doctor uses a ring forceps to pull the cervix toward the outer vaginal opening.208
Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 874-75 (D. Neb. 2004), aff’d sub nom.
fetus around so that its feet are protruding into the vagina, he has committed a
felony.201
Posner believes that to “any rational person, it makes no difference
whether, when the skull is crushed, the fetus is entirely within the
uterus or its feet are outside the uterus.”  How can “the position of the202
feet”  have any moral significance?203 204
Posner’s argument fails in part because his facts are wrong. He
incorrectly thinks that the partial-birth procedure kills the fetus when
it is still entirely within the woman, i.e., its feet are “protruding into the
vagina.”  Posner’s misperception is made irrefutably clear in an205
earlier decision in the same lawsuit, in which he states that “death
[occurs] while the body of the fetus [is] in the vagina.”  There is206
overwhelming evidence contradicting Posner’s conclusion. In part due
to instruments used to reduce the distance between the cervix  and the207
outer vaginal opening, pulling the fetus into the vagina generally results
in its body being in part, if not largely, outside the woman before it is
killed.  208
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Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
Sometimes the cervix is pulled “to the level of the entrance to the vagina.” Id. at 875.
This in turn means that when the fetal head lodges at the cervix, “the fetal body past
the level of the navel may be outside the woman’s body.” Id. at 874. For similar
testimony by other doctors, see id. at 853, 860, 866, 869, 871, 877, and 881. Based
on this evidence, the court concluded “that the cervix of the woman will frequently
be at or very near the vaginal opening and sometimes even protruding outside the
woman's body. Hence delivery of the fetal body, including the trunk past the navel,
‘outside the body’ customarily would be anticipated before the surgery begins.” Id.
at 1034 n.160. See also Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323,
335 n.4 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that a tenaculum is used to “shorten[], if not
eliminate[], the distance between the cervix” and the outer opening of the vagina),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 873 (2008); infra note 214 (Justice Kennedy’s acceptance of
testimony that fetal death occurs when all but the fetus’s head is outside the woman's
body). The Federal Ban, of course, does not even apply unless either the fetus’s head
or half its lower body “is outside the body of the mother.” See supra note 32 and
accompanying text. This is also true of State bans that use the same limiting language,
such as Virginia’s recently upheld Partial-Birth Infanticide Ban. See Richmond
Medical Center  for Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165, 169 & n.1 (4th Cir. 2009). The
statutes that Judge Posner criticized, however, did not make ban application
conditional on some described part of the fetus being outside the woman at the time
of fetal death. The Illinois and Wisconsin statutes spoke only of “partially vaginally
deliver[ing] a living human fetus or infant.” See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857,
862-63 (7th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 249 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2001) (reversed due to Carhart
I). Nonetheless, the evidence shows that “partially vaginally deliver[ing]” a fetus
necessarily involves dragging the fetus partially, if not largely, outside the woman’s
body. 
 Posner is not alone in his mistake. As noted, Professor Laurence Tribe209
misunderstands the procedure, supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text, as does
Judge Maryanne Barry, supra note 74. She thinks that a partial-birth abortion ban is
“nonsensical” because it bases “the demarcation line between abortion and
infanticide...on where in the woman’s body the fetus expires during an abortion.”
Planned Parenthood of Central N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 144 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 880 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., dissenting),210
rev’d, 249 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2001). 
Posner’s blindness to what the partial-birth procedure actually
entails  is richly ironic, for later in his opinion he criticizes public209
support for partial-birth abortion bans as based “on sheer ignorance of
the medical realities of late-term abortion.”  In purporting to instruct210
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 Id. 211
 550 U.S. at 186. 212
 See supra text accompanying note 195. 213
 “Witnesses to the procedure relate that the fingers and feet of the fetus are moving214
prior to the piercing of the skull; when the scissors are inserted in the back of the
head, the fetus’s body, wholly outside the woman’s body and alive, reacts as though
startled and goes limp.” Carhart I, 530 U.S. 914, 963 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added) (statement obviously refers to the nurse’s testimony, see
supra text accompanying note 195). The Federal Ban, of course, in instances of
feet-first deliveries like the one observed by the nurse, does not even apply unless the
fetus’s body from above the navel is outside the woman. See supra note 32 and
accompanying text. 
the “uninformed,” he once more misstates the facts by asserting “that
the only difference between [the partial-birth procedure] and the
methods of late-term abortion that are conceded all round to be
constitutionally privileged is which way the fetus’s feet are
pointing.”  211
While Posner persistently misstates the facts, Justices Stevens and
Ginsberg are unwilling to confront them directly. In their concurring
opinions in Carhart I, they do not even mention that the partial-birth
procedure kills a fetus who is partially, if not largely, outside the
woman’s body. Similarly, in their dissent in Carhart II, they only refer
(unfavorably) to any line between “‘abortion and infanticide’ based not
on whether a fetus can survive outside the womb, but on where a fetus
is anatomically located when a particular medical procedure is
performed.”  “[W]here a fetus is anatomically located” is a phrase212
well-calculated to mask the reality lying behind the nurse’s
observation –moving fingers and kicking feet were visible because213
they had already emerged from the woman.214
Because Judge Posner and Justices Stevens and Ginsberg never
directly engage the reality of the partial-birth procedure, it is hard to
take seriously their assertions of the ban’s irrationality. Professor
Cynthia Gorney, however, does not dissemble, but graphically
Life and Learning XVIII134
 Gorney, supra note 33, at 34. 215
 Id. at 33. 216
 Id. at 44. Gorney specifically addresses these two questions to “the dedicated217
right-to-life person,” id., but her article in effect poses them more generally–via her
assertion that because “pulling a fetus from a woman’s body in dismembered pieces
is legal, medically acceptable, and safe,” it makes no “ethical sense” to criminalize
the partial-birth procedure. See id. at 33. Although it will be shown that this argument
is deeply misguided, it has broad support. See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 84
(Carhart II’s “allusions to the state’s respect for fetal life spin like an idle wheel,
given that the holding does not actually protect fetal lives, in that it permits a range
of alternative techniques for late-term abortion”) (footnote omitted); supra text
accompanying notes 110-111 (Professor Laurence Tribe’s similar argument). Cf. Jack
M. Balkin, “How New Genetic Technologies Will Transform Roe v. Wade,” 56
Emory Law Journal 843, 849 & n.27 (2007) (in view of alternative permissible ways
to kill the fetus, Carhart II can be criticized for emphasizing the state interest in
potential life); Susan Frelich Appleton, “Gender, Abortion, and Travel After Roe’s
End,” 51 St. Louis University Law Journal. 655, 661-62 (2007) (legal alternatives of
killing the fetus demonstrate that partial-birth abortion bans serve only the state’s
“ideological or symbolic interests”). 
describes the partial-birth procedure, including the fact that “‘the
baby’s body is exposed’” when it is killed,  i.e., its body is largely215
outside the woman. Despite her clear-eyed recognition of this crucial
fact, Gorney too argues that a ban, because it does not prohibit the
classic D&E technique, “makes clear ethical sense only to people who
don’t spend much time thinking about abortion.”  “[I]sn’t it ethically216
repugnant to press the case that one method of ending fetal life is worse
than another? Isn’t this like arguing about whether murder by gunshot
is societally preferable to murder by strangulation?”217
Professor Gorney’s question deserves a straightforward answer.
Before I do so, however, it is important to emphasize the precise legal
issue under discussion–whether partial-birth abortion bans are
rationally grounded. The question thus is not whether one agrees or
disagrees with Gorney’s critique. Nor is the question whether ban
supporters can convince everyone else to endorse bans. Rather, all that
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 Consider Justice Kennedy’s response in Carhart I to Justices Ginsberg’s and218
Stevens’s assertion that Nebraska’s partial-birth abortion ban was irrational because
it did not prohibit D&E abortion: “The issue is not whether members of the judiciary
can see a difference between the two procedures. It is whether Nebraska can.... [The
partial-birth procedure’s] stronger resemblance to infanticide means Nebraska could
conclude...[it] presents a greater risk of disrespect for life and a consequent greater
risk to the [medical] profession and society, which depend for their sustenance upon
reciprocal recognition of dignity and respect. The Court is without authority to
second-guess this conclusion.”
530 U.S. at 962-63 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 Gorney, supra note 33, at 40. This observation succinctly captures Roe’s impact219
on state attempts to limit either the permissible reasons for abortion or the point
during pregnancy at which abortion is no longer allowed–Roe slammed the door on
all such regulatory efforts. Gorney thus acknowledges the validity of abortion
opponents’ summary of the Roe standard: “'[L]egal at any time, for any reason, all the
way through the ninth month of pregnancy.'“ See id. at 39-40. This permissiveness is
mandatory due to the broad nature of the health exception that limits a state’s power
to prohibit even post-viability abortions. Id. at 39. See infra text accompanying note
227. Gorney’s accuracy in describing Roe is commendable. Incorrect depictions are
legion, in particular those stating that Roe only prohibited state restrictions on early
abortions. Most surprisingly, even Justice O’Connor has made this mistake. Sandra
Day O’Connor, The Majesty of the Law (2003), p. 45: Roe “struck down as
unconstitutional limitations by states on abortions in the first three months of
pregnancy.” For additional examples, see Jack M. Balkin, “Roe v. Wade: An Engine
of Controversy” in What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said, ed. Jack M. Balkin (2005),
p.4 n.4: (describing a 2003 ABC News-Washington Post poll that characterized Roe
“as giving women the ability to get abortions if they want one at any time during the
first trimester”); Gregg Easterbrook, “Abortion and Brain Waves,” The New
Republic, Jan. 31, 2000, at 21, 24 (Roe “all but ban[ned]” abortion in the third
trimester); and Manny Fernandez, “Abortion Protest Draws Thousands,” The
Washington Post, Jan. 23, 2004, at B1 (Roe “prevented states from restricting
abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy”). For other examples of accurate
ban proponents must do is make a rational case for their position.218
This task is readily accomplished, as one of Gorney’s own illustrations
makes clear.
Gorney points out that a woman twenty-eight weeks pregnant who
wants an abortion to better fit her prom dress can legally get one under
Roe.  Does this mean that it makes no “ethical sense” to punish as219
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descriptions of Roe, see David Brown, “Late Term Abortions; Who Gets Them and
Why,” The Washington Post, Sept. 17, 1996, at Z12 (“Contrary to a widely held
public impression, third-trimester abortion is not outlawed in the United States....
[L]ife-threatening conditions need not exist in order for a woman to get a
third-trimester abortion.”), and Roy Rivenburg, supra note 30, at E8: “If a woman can
find a doctor who says her emotional health is disturbed by a pregnancy, she can get
an abortion at any stage of pregnancy.”
 Professor Gorney has referred to infanticide as an “unquestionable wrong.” See220
Gorney, supra note 40, at 346. While this does not necessarily connote her support
of laws against the practice, elsewhere she has implicitly assumed the legitimacy of
laws against “child-killing.” See Cynthia Gorney, “Reversing Roe: Is Mainstream
Right-to-Life Ready for an Abortion Ban?” in The New Yorker, June 26, 2006, at 46,
52. 
 Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 882 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., dissenting),221
rev’d, 249 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 Id.222
infanticide the killing of babies of that age who have been born
prematurely? Of course not. Prohibiting the killing of born infants is
essential in any civilized society. Gorney shares this view,  despite220
her awareness that society, due to Roe, cannot effectively prohibit the
killing of the same baby within the womb. 
If protecting babies born prematurely is rational, then so are
partial-birth abortion bans. The partial-birth technique kills a baby in
the midst of a birth process, just inches from being fully born. Bans are
thus supported by the same moral reasoning underlying laws punishing
infanticide. Interestingly, Posner provides unintended corroboration in
the two opinions already cited. In his heralded 1999 dissent, he defends
laws against infanticide because it, unlike feticide, occurs after birth.
“Once the baby emerges from the mother’s body,” Posner opined,
killing it can no longer be justified.  But there is a right to kill “as221
long as the baby remains within the mother’s body.”  In the partial-222
birth process the baby is killed–despite Posner’s apparent unawareness
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 See supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text. 223
 Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1998).224
See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text. 
 In the Carhart II oral arguments, Justice Ginsburg rejected as “beside the point”225
the Solicitor General’s ban defense based on concerns about infanticide. Transcript
of Oral Argument at 16, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05-380).
Why? Because bans do not prohibit the killing of the same fetus “inside the womb.”
Id. at 4. In response, the Solicitor General asked Justice Ginsberg to consider a
“lawful post-viability abortion”: “There is a problem with the mother’s health, there
is a problem with her life so it’s a lawful post-viability abortion. I don’t think that
anybody thinks that the law is or should be indifferent to whether in that case fetal
demise takes place in utero or outside the mother's womb. The one is abortion, the
other is murder” (id. at 16). This reply admittedly was somewhat opaque. Its intended,
compelling point was that the freedom to kill a child in the womb does not bestow
unlimited power to kill it regardless of its location. See supra notes 219-20 and
accompanying text. But the Solicitor General, in addition to making post-viability
abortions sound more restricted than they are, see supra note 219 and accompanying
text, failed to clarify what “outside the mother’s womb” scenario he had in
mind–presumably a premature birth. In any event, Justice Ginsburg either missed or
deliberately ignored the point the Solicitor General was trying to make. She replied
that “if this case were limited to post-viability abortions it would be a different
matter.” Transcript, supra at 17. This comment is completely non-responsive. If bans
applied only post-viability, women still could freely have their viable babies killed
in utero. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. Would post-viability bans
therefore be irrational? It thus is clear that Justice Ginsberg in no meaningful sense
“corrected” the Solicitor General’s emphasis on infanticide prevention, as has been
claimed. See Burnett, supra note 198, at 261. 
of the fact–when it no longer “remains within the mother’s body.”223
Why then is it irrational to prohibit the procedure? In his 1998 opinion,
Posner “do[es] not doubt” that a state could criminalize the “killing
[of] a live baby that is half-born.”  It has been shown that this is224
precisely what the partial-birth procedure entails.
Nor are bans rendered irrational by their failure to prohibit classic
D&E.  Judge Posner, a chief proponent of this view, contradicts225
himself by acknowledging that a state can appropriately criminalize “as
infanticide” the killing of a baby in the birth canal during “the course
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 See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text. 226
 Gorney, supra note 33, at 39. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 227
 Additional support for the rationality of partial-birth abortion bans comes from228
information on how English physicians are advised to handle the problem of fetuses
born alive following abortion attempts. Under English law, such a fetus, if viable,
“becomes a child and a deliberate act that causes the death of a child is murder, even
if that deliberate act precedes the birth.” Vadeyar, et. al., supra note 83, at 1159. The
authors therefore state “that if an abortion is taking place at a gestational age at which
the fetus is capable of remaining alive it is imperative that feticide is performed prior
to delivery.” Id. Does the fact that a fetus can legally be killed before delivery
discredit the law designed to protect it after its birth? The obvious answer is “no.”
Similarly, laws protecting fetuses in the delivery process make “ethical sense,”
contrary to Professor Gorney’s assertion, supra text accompanying note 216, even
though those same fetuses could be legally killed moments before. (For the argument
that it is irrelevant that most fetuses killed via the partial-birth procedure are not
viable, see supra notes 159-72 and accompanying text.) 
 But cf. infra notes 251-67 and accompanying text (discussing how the protection229
Roe affords to dismemberment D&Es impacts partial-birth abortion bans). 
of a normal labor.”  But, as Professor Gorney has correctly stated,226
Roe allows the abortion of even a full-term baby: “If the doctor attests
that she needs it...the state is not supposed to interfere, no matter how
advanced her pregnancy is.”  Why then, if partial-birth abortion bans227
are irrational due to their failure to cover D&E, isn’t Posner’s defense
of such infanticide laws also irrational due to their failure to ban
full-term abortions? Both laws criminalize killing a baby while it is
emerging from its mother, but neither prohibits killing that same baby
before it begins to emerge. Consequently, either both laws are irrational
or neither is. I obviously endorse the latter option.  The emergence of228
a child from the mother’s body has a broader significance than Posner
is able to acknowledge. Once the birth process begins–whatever its
nature–the child is a proper subject of governmental protection
untrammeled by Roe.229
The gap in ban coverage admittedly leaves most second trimester
fetuses unprotected. But any effort to criminalize D&E would plainly
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 Similarly, opponents of pornography are not irrational for failing to seek to230
criminalize the private possession of pornography, since such an effort would
inevitably fall to constitutional challenge. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969). But they also are acting rationally in enacting constitutionally permissible
prohibitions of the private possession of child pornography. See Osborne v. Ohio,
495 U.S. 103 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
 See Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in The Collected231
Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 4 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953), p. 262. 
 The Emancipation Proclamation, for example, was not issued until Lincoln felt it232
could be justified “[a]s a military measure” to deprive the enemy of property. See
David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (1995), p. 456. 
 Ban opponents are not the only ones who have criticized bans’ emphasis upon fetal233
location. At least one pro-life advocate has expressed concern about stressing
physical location in defending the value of human life. To Richard Stith, “location
cannot make an ontological difference.” Stith, supra note 104, at 263. In terms of
their “real worth,” it does not matter whether humans are within the womb, partially
outside the womb, or wholly outside the womb. See id. at 261, 272. Rather, “human
nature, membership in our species,” is what actually underlies “human dignity.” Id.
be stricken under the Roe/Casey standard. Ban proponents can hardly
be branded as “irrational” for failing to prohibit what cannot be
constitutionally prohibited.  They acted prudently by attacking what230
was constitutionally open to attack, whether under the theory defended
in this Article–that the partial-birth procedure is not encompassed by
the abortion right–or on the grounds that Roe/Casey permit partial-birth
abortion bans. 
It is hardly novel for lawmakers to combat incrementally what they
believe to be evil. Abraham Lincoln first fought slavery by attempting
to restrict its expansion, which he believed the Constitution allowed.231
He delayed assaulting the institution of slavery itself until changed
circumstances made that constitutionally permissible.  Legal change232
may someday permit legislatures so inclined to accord more protection
to fetal life. Until that day comes, defending the lives of fetuses who
have begun the birth process is a cause to be praised, not belittled as
irrational.233
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at 272. From this perspective, partial-birth abortion bans are problematic because they
are grounded on a morally irrelevant factor–physical location. But in this regard
aren’t partial-birth abortion bans like Born-Alive Infant Protection Acts? Physical
location–complete separation–is what puts the latter beyond Roe’s scope. See supra
notes 80-86 and accompanying text. They thus erect “a barrier to stop the right to
choose from expanding beyond birth.” Stith, supra note 104, at 275. But, as Professor
Stith recognizes, the laws do not interfere “with the right to life expanding into
pregnancy.” Id. Partial-birth abortion bans are no different. They move the barrier to
choice back a little further–to the birth process–but they do not preclude the argument
that wholly intrauterine life should be protected as well. Any attempt, however, to
further protect prenatal life is currently stymied by Roe. But see infra note 272. 
 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 234
 See Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124, 147-48, 164 (2007). 235
 Common methods include injecting “the fetus with a toxic agent such as potassium236
chloride or digoxin.” Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1318 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
 Justice Ginsberg rejects this assertion due to the health risks associated with killing237
the fetus via injection. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 180 n.6. The weakness in this argument
is the apparent routineness with which prior fetal demise is induced. Dr. Leroy
B. Implications for Federal and State Bans 
1. Federal Ban 
Carhart II left the door open for an as-applied challenge to the Federal
Ban due to its lack of a health exception.  But it can be argued that234
under a rational basis standard a health exception is unnecessary.
Lawmakers acted to prohibit partial-birth abortion because it closely
approaches infanticide. Surely no one thinks that a law prohibiting
infanticide must have a health exception. There is no reason to treat
partial-birth abortion bans differently. In fact, differential
treatment–requiring a health exception–would be especially
inappropriate because bans are inapplicable if the fetus is killed prior
to its partial delivery.  Thus, by killing the child while it is still in the235
womb,  any perceived health benefits that intact deliveries offer236
women arguably can still be realized without thwarting the purpose of
deterring infanticide.  237
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Carhart, for example, almost always does so for fetuses of at least eighteen weeks
gestational age. Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 854, 907-08 (D. Neb.
2004), aff’d sub nom., Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550
U.S. 124 (2007). Further, The Los Angeles Times reported that of the 3,000 to 5,000
yearly partial-birth procedures known to one abortion proponent in 1995, every single
one was preceded by killing “the fetus in the womb–by injecting it with poison or
cutting the umbilical cord.” Rivenburg, supra note 30 at E8. This high incidence of
killing the fetus beforehand must mean that doctors have determined that doing so is
not particularly risky. 
 The lack of a health exception could also be grounds for challenging state bans,238
if, for example, a state decided that its constitution provides more protection to the
abortion right than that conferred by the U.S. Constitution. The potential impact of
a rational basis analysis on the asserted requirement of a health exception has already
been discussed. See supra notes 234-37 and accompanying text. 
 Michigan’s statute was not worded as a ban of the partial-birth procedure, see infra239
notes 245-46 and accompanying text, but that plainly was its purpose. 
 Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Herring, 527 F.3d 128, 137-39 (4th Cir.240
2008), rev’d en banc, 570 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 2009). The Federal Ban does not apply
to such situations because it requires that a doctor have had the intent to initiate an
intact procedure: “If the doctor intends to remove the fetus in parts from the outset,
the doctor will not have the requisite intent to incur criminal liability.” Carhart II,
550 U.S. at 151. 
2. State Bans
The potential impact of a rational basis analysis on state partial-birth
abortion laws is a complicated subject, and it is beyond the scope of
this Article fully to explore it. Rather, the types of issues that might
arise  will be indicated by briefly considering two state bans–in238
Virginia and Michigan–whose constitutionality has been assessed
subsequent to Carhart II. The key inquiry in both cases was whether
the challenged bans  conformed closely enough to the Federal Ban to239
be upheld. 
Virginia’s ban was initially stricken by a Fourth Circuit panel
because, unlike the Federal Ban, it was interpreted to apply to doctors
intending to perform dismemberment D&Es, but who instead
accidentally bring an intact fetus substantially outside the woman.240
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 See Richmond Medical Center for Women, 527 F.3d at 145-46. 241
 Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 2009) (en242
banc). 
 Id. at 176. 243
 Id. at 179. Consider, for example, a doctor who intends to procure a244
dismemberment D&E, but instead faces a substantially delivered fetus whose head is
“lodged in the cervix.” Id. at 178. The court believed that this situation would “almost
always endanger the mother’s life.” Id. The Virginia ban’s life-of-the-mother
exception would allow the doctor to “complete the D & E procedure...[with] an
unequivocal affirmative defense to any criminal liability under the Virginia Act.” Id.
 Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 327 (6th Cir. 2007),245
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 873 (2008). The statute in dispute, the Legal Birth Definition
Act, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 333.1081-85 (West Supp. 2008), was Michigan’s
third attempt to prohibit the partial-birth procedure. Its first effort, a partial-birth
abortion ban, was struck down in Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Mich.
1997). Its second effort, entitled the Infant Protection Act, was invalidated in
WomanCare of Southfield v. Granholm, 143 F. Supp. 2d 827 (E.D. Mich. 2000). The
third attempt, entitled the Legal Birth Definition Act, was passed in 2003, but vetoed
by the Governor. See Betsy DeVos, “Voters Rebuke Partial-Birth Abortion Veto,”
Since regular D&E is the most common second-trimester abortion
technique, subjecting doctors who perform it to the risk of prosecution
was held to impose an undue burden on the woman’s abortion right.241
The Fourth Circuit, en banc, reversed and upheld the statute.  The242
court acknowledged that the Virginia ban differs from the Federal Ban
by covering doctors who intend a D&E, but unintentionally cause an
intact partial delivery.  Nonetheless, the ban was constitutional243
because it has other features that “clearly delineate[] the rare
circumstances in which a doctor [would] incur liability, thus enabling
a doctor to perform a standard D&E without fear that accidental
[substantial] emergence of the fetus” would in itself result in criminal
prosecution.244
Michigan’s statute did not even mention the partial-birth
procedure. Instead, “it creates a protected legal status for a
partially-delivered fetus that it terms a ‘perinate.’”  A perinate is “‘a245
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The Grand Rapids Press, June 24, 2004, at A15, available at 2004 WLNR 17813169.
It was passed again in 2004, having been proposed by an initiative petition, a process
that insulated the measure from the Governor’s veto power. Id. The petition drive
garnered over 460,000 signatures. Id. This third effort also ultimately failed. See
Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc., v. Cox, 394 F. Supp. 2d 978 (E.D. Mich.
2005), aff'd, 487 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 873 (2008).
Undeterred, Michigan lawmakers in 2008 passed another partial-birth abortion ban,
but it was vetoed by Governor Jennifer Granholm. See Chris Christoff, “Gov.
Granholm Vetoes Abortion Bill, Mandatory Helmet Bill,” Detroit Free Press, June
13, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 11198631. An override attempt was
contemplated. Id. At present, another ban, introduced in 2009 and tracking the
language of the Federal Ban, is under consideration by the Michigan legislature.
Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act., S.B. 147, 148; H.B. 4212, 4213 (2009). 
 Northland Family Planning Clinic, 487 F.3d at 327. 246
 Id. at 336-37. The statute is triggered when “‘any anatomical part’” passes outside247
the woman. Id. at 327. “‘Anatomical part’ means any portion of the anatomy of a
human being that has not been severed from the body, but not including the umbilical
cord or placenta.” Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.1085(a) (West Supp. 2008). 
 See Northland Family Planning Clinic, 487 F.3d at 336-37. 248
live human being at any point after which any anatomical part of the
human being is known to have passed beyond the...[outer vaginal
opening] until the point of complete expulsion or extraction from the
mother’s body.’”  The Sixth Circuit invalidated the statute because it246
lacked those “anatomical landmarks,” i.e., the entire head or the body
from above the navel downward, that ensure the Federal Ban does not
apply to D&E’s.  Because the challenged statute prohibited standard247
D&E abortions, it imposed an unconstitutional undue burden on the
abortion right.248
How might the introduction of a rational basis analysis have
impacted the resolution of these two cases? Concerning the issue raised
in the Virginia litigation, a constitutional challenge to bans applicable
to doctors who do not from the outset intend to procure an intact,
partial delivery would seemingly more likely fail under a rational basis
approach than under the Carhart II analysis, premised in Roe/Casey.
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 See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text. 249
 Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165, 181 (4th Cir.250
2009) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (en banc). 
 The Fourth Circuit panel initially struck down the Virginia ban for precisely this251
reason. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text. 
 But see the discussion in infra notes 260-61 and accompanying text. 252
 See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 253
 The dissenters believed that the majority’s interpretation of the life-of-the-mother254
After all, an abortionist’s intent surely is irrelevant to the legislative
goal of preventing infanticide. If an intact, living fetus is partially born,
killing it constitutes infanticide no matter what abortion technique was
initially intended. The recent Fourth Circuit decision, though, shows
that such an expanded ban can be upheld even under Carhart II.  As249
stated by Judge Wilkinson’s concurring opinion, “[t]he state’s interest
in protecting life recognized in [Carhart II] does not vanish when the
intact delivery of the child is unintentional.... The state may prohibit a
deliberate and unconscionable act against the intact, partially born
child, regardless of how the child got there.”  Consequently, a rational250
basis approach is not an absolute prerequisite for according
constitutional legitimacy to broader bans. 
But a potential constitutional obstacle remains–the possible
negative impact of more expansive bans on the availability of
dismemberment D&Es.  These standard D&Es do not involve partial251
births,  and thus would still be subject to Casey’s undue burden252
standard. One could defend a broader ban’s constitutionality by
following the lead of the Fourth Circuit in ultimately upholding
Virginia’s ban–emphasize other statutory safeguards that would protect
doctors from liability in such instances.  This approach convinced the253
six judges in the majority, but not the five dissenting judges, who
thought that the alleged protections for doctors performing
dismemberment D&Es were inadequate.  A rational basis approach254
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exception was flawed because it would also permit even intentional partial-birth
extractions to proceed without liability for the doctor. 570 F.3d at 193-94 (Michael,
J., dissenting). 
 See supra text accompanying note 235. 255
 Critics would undoubtedly brand this suggestion as “irrational” because if the256
injection alternative kills the fetus, how can one reasonably claim that it furthers a
state interest against infanticide? This critique, like the similar criticism based on
bans’ inapplicability to D&E abortion, gives insufficient weight to a fetus’s location
at the time of its death. See supra notes 219-33 and accompanying text. 
 See supra note 237. 257
 The decisions are replete with assertions that D&Es pose greater health risks to258
women than the partial-birth procedure. These reputed safety disadvantages were the
principal factual basis for the view that partial-birth abortion bans must include a
health exception. See, e.g., Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 801-02 (8th Cir.
2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Planned Parenthood Federation of America v.
Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1000-01 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Planned
Parenthood Federation of America v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d
sub nom. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 One motivation behind the Federal Ban was concern over fetal pain: “[D]uring a259
partial-birth abortion procedure, the child will fully experience the pain associated
with piercing his or her skull and sucking out his or her brain.” Congressional Finding
14(M), in notes following 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. V 2000). Many of the ban cases
contain discussions of the fetus’s capacity to feel pain. The conclusions expressed
would provide a way to avoid this debate about the effectiveness of
Virginia’s particular statutory safeguards. As noted, partial-birth
abortion bans already provide a safe harbor for abortionists who do not
want to risk prosecution–kill the fetus before taking action that could
lead to its intact extraction. An injection to stop the fetal heart makes
a ban violation impossible.  Subjecting an abortionist to this choice255
arguably is justified by the legitimate governmental purpose of
deterring infanticide.  Nor is injection barred by concern for health256
risks to the woman. While there is some risk,  it is counterbalanced257
by the health advantages of avoiding a dismemberment D&E.258
Injection is also a more humane way to kill the fetus.259
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vary. One federal district judge accepted as a fact “unrebutted...credible evidence
that...[the partial-birth procedure] subject[s] fetuses to severe pain.” National
Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d
sub nom. National Abortion Federation v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 2006),
vacated, 224 Fed. Appx. 88 (2d Cir. 2007). Another judge found that “[t]he issue of
whether fetuses feel pain is unsettled in the scientific community.” Planned
Parenthood Federation of America v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1002 (N.D. Cal.
2004), aff'd sub nom. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Gonzales,
435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d sub nom. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124
(2007). In any event, the court said the issue is irrelevant, for if a fetus does feel pain,
it would experience “no less and in fact [what] might be greater [pain]” in a D&E
abortion. Id. A third judge assumes that a non-viable fetus is able to feel pain “at
some point during its gestation,” but believes the issue to be only “marginally” legally
relevant, if at all, in part because all methods of killing the fetus would be painful.
Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1029 (D. Neb. 2004), aff’d sub nom.
Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
While the court suggests that it is impossible to differentiate levels of pain between
death by being “torn apart” in a D&E abortion versus death by heart stoppage due to
injection, see id., this conclusion is plainly counterintuitive. 
 See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text. 260
 See supra notes 87-121 and accompanying text. 261
 Justice Thomas, in Carhart I, argued that standard D&Es do not involve birth262
because the concept of “‘delivery’” does not encompass removing “the child from the
uterus piece by piece.” Carhart I, 530 U.S. 914, 990 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
The dismemberment that D&Es entail, however, usually does not occur completely
within the womb. See infra note 263. Thus, a baby typically is still living and intact
Concerning the Michigan statute, this Article has earlier stressed
that the anatomical landmarks it lacks ensure that the partial-birth
procedure does entail, contrary to Judge Posner’s assertion, killing a
“half-born” baby.  But if the Roe abortion right is delimited by the260
onset of birth,  should a state be permitted to extend legal protection261
to babies emerging from the mother’s body, but not yet “half-born”? A
living, intact baby begins the birth process whenever any part of its
body, however small, emerges from its mother. This is so even when
caused by an abortionist’s pulling an extremity outside the womb for
the purpose of initiating a dismemberment D&E.  Despite this factual262
Samuel W. Calhoun 147
when its first limb is torn off. 
 A D&E abortion typically does not tear the fetus apart completely inside the263
womb. Rather, the doctor pulls a fetal body part, e.g., a leg, out of the womb and
often outside the woman altogether before wrenching it off. The disarticulation is
possible due to the resistance caused when the rest of the fetus’s body lodges at the
cervix. Thus, in a D&E abortion, there will often be times when an intact fetus is
partially drawn outside the woman before it is killed. See, e.g., Carhart v. Ashcroft,
331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 860, 866, 871, 877-78 (D. Neb. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Carhart
v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). Applying a
partial-birth abortion ban to this situation would obviously subject doctors who
perform D&E’s to the risk of a ban violation. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Central N.J.
v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d 478, 497 & n.11 (expressing concern that interpreting Roe
as inapplicable to partially born fetuses “could potentially exclude all conventional
abortion procedures from constitutional protection”), aff’d sub nom. Planned
Parenthood of Central N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000). This result could
be avoided by retaining the previously criticized intention requirement. See supra text
accompanying note 249. 
 It might be argued that the very existence of this dilemma demonstrates that the264
interpretation of Roe defended in this Article is incorrect. After all, is it plausible that
the Court would have written a self-contradictory opinion? The problem with this
critique is that rejecting the “Roe is inapplicable” perspective does not avoid the issue
of self-contradiction. If Roe is interpreted as still applying once the birth process
begins, then what is one to make of all the evidence suggesting that this is not what
the Roe Court intended? See supra notes 92-141 and accompanying text. 
 It would also sacrifice the argument that the intention of the doctor should be265
irrelevant to the legal protection offered to partially born babies. See supra text
reality, a legislature can only protect what the Court allows to be
protected. A triggering standard of “‘any anatomical part'“ reveals a
contradiction in the impact of Roe, even if properly interpreted. A
partial-birth prohibition at this earliest stage of delivery should be
allowed due to Roe’s “onset of birth” limitation, but any such ban
would impermissibly infringe upon the right to a D&E abortion.263
One solution to this dilemma  would be to rewrite the Michigan264
statute to track the Federal Ban, thus presumably ensuring
constitutional validity. But this obviously sacrifices the principle that
any partially born baby is a proper subject of state protection.  An265
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accompanying note 249. 
 It can also be argued that there is no meaningful moral distinction based on266
whether any of the baby is outside the woman. See supra note 233. But some part of
a living, intact fetus must be outside of the woman to trigger the “Roe is inapplicable”
argument. 
 See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text. As previously discussed, this267
alternative arguably does not impermissibly put women’s health at risk, see supra
notes 257-58 and accompanying text, and also is supported by humanitarian concern
for the fetus. See supra note 259 and accompanying text. 
 See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text. As previously discussed, this268
alternative arguably does not impermissibly put women's health at risk, see supra
notes 257-58 and accompanying text, and also is supported by humanitarian concern
for the fetus. See supra note 259 and accompanying text. 
 Justice Scalia believed that Casey did not support the Court’s decision to invalidate269
Nebraska’s ban. See Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 953-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Whether
Justice Scalia was correct as to how Casey should be applied to state partial-birth
abortion bans is beyond the scope of this article, which instead argues that such
statutes are not subject to Casey. 
 This article attempts to establish this proposition beyond challenge. At the very270
alternative is to argue that the present Michigan statute satisfies the
rational basis test. After all, there is no meaningful moral distinction
based on how much of a baby is outside the woman.  Doctors’266
freedom to perform D&E’s can be preserved by the practice of killing
the fetus before beginning any D&E procedure.267
CONCLUSION
With respect to what he calls “live-birth abortion,” Justice Scalia thinks
it “is quite simply absurd” to believe “that the Constitution of the
United States...prohibits...banning this visibly brutal means of
eliminating our half-born posterity.”  Scalia is correct, but for reasons268
beyond those given in his opinion.  As has long been argued, the269
partial-birth procedure is not encompassed by the abortion right
conferred by Roe.  Consequently, current partial-birth jurisprudence270
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least, it is hoped that the article demonstrates that the “Roe is inapplicable” argument
has substantial merit and that courts have been wrong to respond to it dismissively or
derisively. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text. 
 The principal point of this article is that Roe, properly interpreted, does not apply271
to killing a baby during its birth. There is, of course, an alternative argument for the
constitutionality of partial-birth abortion bans. As Carhart II demonstrates, bans can
be written in a way that satisfies the Roe/Casey standard. 
 For an argument that Carhart II opens the door to banning dismemberment D&Es,272
see Stephen G. Gilles, As Justice Kennedy Said. See First Things (Jan. 2008), at p.
18, available at http://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/12/002-as-justice-kennedy-
said. Evaluating this contention is beyond the scope of this article.
 This article is a revised and expanded version of a talk I presented at the 2008 UFL273
Conference. The author thanks Stephen Calhoun, Teresa Collett, Stephen Gilles,
Allan Ides, Doug Kmiec, Ann Massie, Rick Schlauch, David Smolin, Richard Stith,
and Robin Wilson for their help. Thanks also to Bridget Fay and Sam Huang for their
valuable research assistance. The author also appreciates the financial assistance
provided by the Frances Lewis Law Center, Washington and Lee University School
of Law.
applies the wrong test. State bans and the Federal Ban are properly
subject only to rational basis review. 
Prominent ban critics, including Judge Posner and Justices Stevens
and Ginsberg, assert that bans are irrational because they do not
prohibit D&E abortion. To them, the right to kill by one method
bestows an unrestrained right to kill. But D&E is protected by Roe,
whereas the partial-birth procedure is not.  Lawmakers thus have271
much more freedom to act against the latter.  Because they can272
reasonably conclude that killing a child during its birth verges on
infanticide, banning the partial-birth procedure plainly satisfies the
rational basis test.273
